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RECOGNIZING AND REMEDYING THE
HARM OF BATTERING: A CALL TO
CRIMINALIZE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER*
I. INTRODUCTION

Domestic violence as defined by our criminal justice system bears
little resemblance to the abuse inflicted on over half a million women by
intimate partners each year.' The disconnect between battering as it is2
practiced and battering as it is criminalized is vast and it is significant.
Law's failure to define accurately the nature and harm of domestic violence
" Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; A.B., Harvard
College, 1992; J.D., Yale Law School, 1996. 1 am grateful to Jane Aiken, Laurence
Busching, Colleen Khoury, Lois Lupica, Myrna Raeder, Frank Tuerkheimer, Laura
Underkuffler, Jennifer Wriggins, Melvyn Zarr, Donald Zillman, members of the New
England Junior Faculty Exchange and participants at the University of Maine Faculty
Workshop for insightful comments on earlier drafts. Many thanks to Sherry Abbott and
Justin Weiss for excellent research assistance, and to Dean Colleen Khoury and the
University of Maine School of Law for providing generous summer research support.
Finally, I am privileged to have served as a prosecutor in the New York County District
Attorney's office and its Family Violence Bureau. This Article is dedicated to the many
victims of domestic violence who told me their stories.
The Department of Justice estimates that in the year 2001, close to 600,000 women
were reportedly victims of intimate partner violence. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE,
1993-2001 (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ipv0l.html. This number reflects an underestimation
of the true incidence of domestic violence. See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of
Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 50 (1992)
("Battered women who reported assaults have typically represented a small portion of the
total number of victims."). A battered woman may perceive that involving the state is not in
her best interest for any number of reasons. Apart from the obvious safety concerns,
domestic violence victims often struggle with economic dependence, immigration issues,
child care and child custody, emotional ties to the abuser, and hostility toward the criminal
justice system. See generally Sarah Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse
Victims Stay, 28 COLO. LAW. 19 (1999).
2 See infra Part II.A.
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negates the experiences of victims 3 and effectively places battering outside

the reach of criminal sanctions.4 The criminal justice system's structurally
deficient response to harms suffered largely by women5 percolates outside
the boundaries of law, warping social understandings of domestic violence.
Premised on a transactional model of crime that isolates and
decontextualizes violence, the law applied to domestic abuse conceals the
reality of an ongoing pattern of conduct occurring within a relationship

3 Tensions surround the linguistic construction of victims of battering. Elizabeth
Schneider observes that the term "battering" inevitably gives rise to the descriptive phrase
"battered woman," which in turn "raises critical questions of definition and strategy":
In contrast with other descriptions of harm to women, "battered woman" describes the victim
and focuses on her qualities. A woman is or is not a "battered woman." The phrase is reductive
in that it implies the total life experience of the particular woman: a "battered woman" can be no
more than a woman who has been battered.
ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 61 (2000). Both
"battered woman" and "victim" problematically suggest "images of helplessness and defeat
rather than survival and resistance." Id. at 62. See Martha Mahoney, Victimization or
Oppression? Women's Lives, Violence and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE
VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 59 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne
Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (exploring the "challenge of analyzing structures of oppression while
including an account of the resistance, struggles, and achievements of the oppressed").
Hopeful that contextualizing women's experience of battering will expose the falsity of
the victim/agent dichotomy, I use the terms "battered woman" and "victim" to emphasize the
basic proposition that women are indeed harmed by battering.
4 See infra Part II.C.
5 In the vast majority of cases, women are the victims of domestic violence and men the
perpetrators. Approximately eighty-five to ninety percent of heterosexual partner violence
reported to law enforcement is perpetrated by men. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SPECIAL REPORT: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 2 (2000); PHYSICAL
ASSAULTS BY HUSBANDS: A MAJOR SOCIAL PROBLEM, CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE 89-90 (R.J. Gelles & D.R. Loeske eds., 1993). I will therefore use the female
pronoun when referring to victims of intimate partner violence and the male pronoun when
referring to its perpetrators.
Much of the discussion in this Article is generally applicable to violence in intimate
relationships, including elder abuse, battering in same-sex relationships, and female violence
against males. See generally Barbara Hart, Lesbian Battering: An Examination, in NAMING
THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING 173 (Kerry Lobel & National
Coalition Against Domestic Violence Lesbian Task Force eds., 1986) (defining lesbian
battering as "that pattern of violent and coercive behaviors whereby a lesbian seeks to
control the thoughts, beliefs or conduct of her intimate partner or to punish the intimate for
resisting the perpetrator's control over her"). I am particularly focused, however, on maleon-female abuse and the criminal justice system's response to it. See infra Part I1.B for a
discussion of the ways in which criminal law has been uniquely non-responsive to the
concerns of women battered by men. See also Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1856 n.24 (1996) (author's scholarly attention to male violence against
women related to "historic and institutional marginalization of intimate violence against
women").
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characterized by power and control. In this Article I explore the rupture
between women's experiences of battering 6 and the remediation offered by
the criminal law. I conclude that statutory descriptions of battering are
inapt and require an overhaul to capture the practice of domestic violence.7
Domestic violence is generally understood-outside the criminal
law-as patterned in nature
manifestations of domination.

and largely defined by non-physical
Part Two describes the dynamics of

domestic abuse, focusing on the centrality of power and control to the
battering relationship. This Part then examines how criminal law
paradigms, developed when violence against wives was lawful, operate to
obscure defining characteristics of domestic violence. By situating the
criminal justice response to battering in historical context, this Part allows
current systemic limitations to be better understood.
Viewing the
criminalization of domestic violence as an evolutionary process also
suggests the potential for further reform.
Part Three maps the contours of the gap between battering as it is

practiced and battering as it is criminalized. To illustrate how law functions
6

There is considerable inter- and intra-disciplinary confusion regarding the meaning of

the terms "battering," "domestic violence" and "domestic abuse." See generally Mary Ann
Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of
Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1191, 1204 (2003) (explaining that in the
scientific field, "spouse abuse, domestic violence, marital assault, woman abuse, and
battering ... are used interchangeably to refer to the broad range of behaviors considered to
be violent and abusive within an intimate relationship"); Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic
Violence Torts. 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 121, 122-23 n.2 (2001) (noting the terminological debate
and adopting a definition of domestic violence that includes "the establishment of control
and fear in a relationship through the use of physical violence, intimidation, and other forms
of abuse") (citing FREDERICA L. LEHRMAN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1.3, at 1-7 (1997)).
From a criminal justice perspective, domestic violence is defined exclusively by
existing criminal statutes. For further analysis of this limitation, see infra Part II.C.
Although an isolated incident of violence between intimates might conceptually fall within
the category of "domestic violence" but not "battering," this distinction is more theoretical
than real. Particularly in the criminal context, it is highly unlikely for a first-time incident of
abuse to come to the attention of law enforcement. We know that the criminal justice
system-calibrated as it is to physical abuse-is not intervening in the early stages of
domination. See infra notes 27-43 and accompanying text. Since the theoretical isolated
incident will rarely if ever come within criminal law's purview, the behaviors encompassed
by the terms "battering" and "domestic violence" are for all practical purposes overlapping,
and the descriptors will be used synonymously throughout this Article. See generally Karla
Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence
Cases, 46 SMU L. REv. 2117 (1993).
7 This Article, in contrast to previous scholarship addressing the intersection of domestic
violence and the criminal justice system, advances a fundamental critique of traditional
criminal law structures as applied to battering and proposes a course of conduct battering
statute to reflect the ongoing, patterned nature of violence in intimate relationships.
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to provide a diminished measure of justice, I consider how a domestic
violence case progresses through the criminal process.
This Part
particularly attends to the ways in which flawed paradigms warp the trial
stage of the proceedings. Criminal law's myopic focus on transactionbased physical violence critically impacts the ability of jurors to function
effectively. Law's failure to account for the practice of domestic violence
undermines the victim's credibility, obscures the batterer's motive and
breeds juror apathy.
Given this gaping disconnect between the suffering of battered women
and the legal apparatus in place to redress harm, we might wonder whether
the system manages imperfectly to negotiate the chasm described by Part
Three. Part Four addresses this inquiry, positing that the realities of
domestic violence exert pressure on incompatible legal structures, creating
tensions and contradictions within existing criminal evidentiary law. This
Part explores areas of law that have been shaped by the actualities of
battering: the admission of "prior bad acts" evidence in the context of
domestic violence prosecutions, expert testimony on battering, and the
application of anti-stalking laws to prosecute abusers. These pressure
points function as mechanisms for a limited measure of legal
accommodation to the dynamics of domestic violence. I will suggest that
the sites where law is sufficiently malleable to yield are significant less for
their remedial power than for what they mark: both the rigidity of
fundamental structures and the force of discordant stories yet unheard.
Part Five discusses the normative implications of criminal law's failure
to define domestic violence as it is practiced and experienced. I contend
that law's legitimacy in this realm is challenged by the location of battering
outside the reach of criminal sanctions. In this Part, I also consider how
victims are impacted individually and collectively by this (mis)location, as
well as how societal understandings of battering are constructed by the legal
definition of domestic violence.
Finally, Part Six suggests that to connect law to the lives of battered
women, criminalization of domestic violence must reflect the on-going and
patterned nature of battering. This Part urges a reconceptualization of the
crime of domestic violence: battering should be criminalized in a manner
that accurately reflects its true nature and harm.
II. DISCONNECT
A. DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Outside the criminal law context, domestic violence is widely
understood as an ongoing pattern of behavior defined by both physical and
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non-physical manifestations of power.'
This is a remarkably
uncontroversial proposition. 9 For women whose lives it describes, the oftdescribed "power and control" dynamic is ubiquitous. Yet the boundaries
of criminal law have remained largely impermeable to this accepted
characterization of battering.' ° To the extent that the law functions in denial
of the experiential realities of domestic violence victims, it does not fully
condemn and cannot truly remedy the harm of battering."
Social scientists, women's advocates and feminist legal scholars have
long recognized that the "struggle for power and control-the batterer's
quest for control of the woman-[lies] at the heart of the battering
process."'2 As psychologist Mary Ann Dutton explains:
Abusive behavior does not occur as a series of discrete events. Although a set of
discrete abusive incidents can typically be identified within an abusive relationship, an

8

Meaningful discussion of domestic violence and its victims does not deny that intra-

group differences may construct the practice and experience of battering. See generally
Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,Identity Politics,and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). "In the context of
violence against women, [the] elision of difference is problematic, fundamentally because
the violence that many women experience is often shaped by other dimensions of their
identities, such as race and class." Id. at 1242. Crenshaw explores what she calls
"intersectionality" in the lives of battered women, concluding that diverse structures of
power-particularly race, gender and class, but also immigrant status and language
barriers-converge to impact the lives of battered women. She writes: "Intersectional
subordination need not be intentionally produced; in fact, it is frequently the consequence of
the imposition of one burden that interacts with preexisting vulnerabilities to create yet
another dimension of disempowerment." Id. at 1249.
This Article proceeds on the assumption that effective legal intervention must be
responsive to these and other intersecting structures of oppression. See id. at 1296; see also
Donna Coker, Piercing Webs ofPower: Identity, Resistance,and Hope in Latcrit Theory and
Praxis:Shifting Powerfor Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of
Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009 (2000). Meaningful theory recognizes and incorporates
this same diversity of experience.
9 See infra notes 12-43 and accompanying text. Those to whom this assertion is virtually
self-evident may find its justification unnecessary. It is nevertheless important to articulate
why this understanding of the battering dynamic is crucial, particularly if the agenda includes
reform.
1o See infra note 315 (challenging the existence of any such boundary between law and
society).
' See infra Part V.
12 Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation,90 MICH. L. REV. 1,5 (1991). As early as 1979, one seminal study of wife abuse
observed that physical violence is a manifestation of a pattern of control and domination by
battering husbands. R. EMERSON DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE

PATRIARCHY, at ix (1979). Given that our understanding of the dynamics of domestic
violence is not new, it should be clear that the criminal justice system's failure to mirror that
which is socially known should not be viewed merely as a "time lag" problem.
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understanding of the dynamic of power and control within an intimate relationship
goes beyond these discrete incidents. To negate the impact of the time period
between discrete episodes of serious violence-a time period during which the
woman may never know when the next incident will occur, and may continue to live
with on-going psychological abuse-is to fail
3 to recognize what some battered woman
experience as a continuing 'state of siege.'

This continuing state of siege has become the focus of much scholarly
commentary within both the social scientific community 14 and the feminist
legal academy.' 5 As a matter of both theory and practice, an accurate
description of battering is "premised on an understanding of coercive
behavior and of power and control-including a continuum of sexual and

13 Dutton, supra note 6, at 1208 (quoting Sue Osthoff, Director, National Clearinghouse

for the Defense of Battered Women).
14 See, e.g., id. at 1204-10 (discussing broader social science definitions of violence
and
abuse, including psychological battering and a focus on patterns of abuse); Fischer et al.,
supra note 6, at 2121 (advocating a more sophisticated understanding of domestic violence
that reflects the full range of abusive conduct typified by batterers, including sexual abuse,
restricted access to money, property destruction, humiliation and degradation, threats to
harm or kill the victim and her children/extended family); Evan Stark, Framing and
Refraining Battered Women, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE

RESPONSE 290 (Eva Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992) (observing that understanding the
battering relationship requires consideration of the abuser's control over money and food,
control over social relationships, control over sexuality, and control over aspects of daily
life); Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REv. 973, 986 (1995) (suggesting that physical violence may
not be the most significant characteristic of most battering relationships and that battered
women generally "have been subjected to an ongoing strategy of intimidation, isolation, and
control that extends to all areas of a woman's life, including sexuality; material necessities;
relations with family, children, and friends; and work").
15See, e.g., Jane Maslow Cohen, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral and
Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill: Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do
They Mean to Morality and for the Criminal Law?, 57 U. Prr. L. REV. 757, 768 (1996)
(framing the battering relationship as an on-going regime of private tyranny); Joan Erskine,
Note, Ifit Quacks Like a Duck: RecharacterizingDomestic Violence as Criminal Coercion,
65 BROOK. L. REV. 1207, 1216-20 (1999) (asserting that need for control motivates domestic
violence); Mahoney, supra note 12, at 34 ("[F]eminist activists writing about heterosexual
battering have ... defined power and control, rather than incidents of violence, as the heart
of the question."); Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological
and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice,21 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1295, 1317 (1993) (observing "a growing emphasis in the literature and community on
understanding battering not as violence, per se, but rather, as a larger pattern of dominance
and control"); Shannon Selden, The PracticeofDomestic Violence, 12 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
1, 11 (2001) (conceptualizing domestic abuse as torture, and noting that "intimate violence
involves separate attacks of physical injury, strung together by patterns of domination,
coercion, and control.... [T]he violence that occurs may be merely one tool of domination
among many.").
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verbal abuse, threats, economic
coercion, stalking, and social isolation16
rather than 'number of hits."

The batterer's desire to dominate his victim functions as the animating
force behind his abusive behaviors.
The effort to subordinate also
represents the conceptual "link between the conduct of the batterer and the
experience of the woman." 17 Recognizing that power and control lie at the
heart of battering necessarily broadens our understanding of what conduct
constitutes the scheme of domestic violence. This expanded definition in
turn challenges a narrow construction of the harm of battering.18
The most powerful evidence of the validity of these assertions is found
in victims' accounts of the abusive relationship. These accounts are
inevitably distorted by applicable structures-legal1 9 and extralegal. 20 But
hearing the stories that battered women tell about their lives is essential to
meaningful discourse on domestic violence. 21 The methodological
imperative common to the social scientific literature and scholarly legal
commentary discussed above 22 is
the crediting of women's accounts of the
23
violence they have experienced.
In this same spirit, my own intuitions about the practice of battering
are informed largely by what I have learned from domestic violence victims
2
about their lives. 24 In hundreds of interviews, each one obviously unique,
supra note 3, at 65.
Mahoney, supra note 12, at 43 (framing this notion of linkage to advocate for law
reform exposing the batterer's "quest for power and control" as necessary for the
development of fuller understandings of battered women who kill in self-defense).
18 See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
I9 For a discussion of the ways in which legal structures pervert the narratives of
domestic violence victims, see infra Part I.B. I.
20 Social scientific research methodologies would be considered extra-legal structures.
21 "Feminist method starts with the very radical act of taking women seriously, believing
16 SCHNEIDER,
17

that what we say about ourselves and our experience is important and valid, even when (or
perhaps especially when) it has little or no relationship to what has been or is being said
about us." Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41
STAN. L. REV. 751, 764 (1989) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MCKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED (1987)).
22 See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
23 Cf CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 5 (1987) ("[F]eminism is built
on believing women's accounts of sexual use and abuse by men.").
24 For five years I prosecuted domestic violence cases in the New York County District
Attorney's Office. During my last year in the office, in my capacity as domestic violence
supervisor, I assembled a more complete picture of the hundreds of domestic violence cases
handled every month by the office.
25 Victims whose cases are handled by the New York County District Attorney's office
are remarkably diverse along many dimensions, particularly with respect to race, ethnicity,
class, age and educational background.
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certain themes and patterns reappeared time and time again. The stories of
these women-and the failure of the legal system to hear them and in turn
provide a full measure of justice-are deeply embedded in my ideas and
their expression. 16
Women's divulgences about the experience of abuse reveal that
context is essential to understanding the nature and harm of battering.
Episodic physical violence, while often a devastating manifestation of the
abuser's control, does not fully define its contours or map its reaches.27
This vast range of suffering-amidst and beyond the physical abuse-is a
place where the criminal law "does not go."'28 The suffering takes many
forms: 2 9

26

Another way of making this point is to observe that the doctrinal critique and

theoretical assertions advanced by this Article are grounded in what I have been able to
glean of the practice of battering from those victimized by it. See Catharine A. MacKinnon,
From Practice to Theory, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 14 (1991) ("We who work with law
need to be about the business of articulating the theory of women's practice-women's
resistance, visions, consciousness, injuries, notions of community, experience of inequality.
By practical I mean socially lived.").
For a general observation about the critical functioning of the personal in academic
writing, see PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE & RIGHTS 92 (1991):
What is "impersonal" writing but denial of self? If withholding is an ideology worth teaching,
we should be clearer about that as the bottom line of the enterprise. We should also
acknowledge the extent to which denial of one's authority in authorship is not the same as
elimination of oneself; it is ruse, not reality.
Id.
Fischer et al., supra note 6, at 2128-29:
[V]iolence does not need to be a constant presence for the victims to feel threatened that it could
erupt at any point, nor does the explosion always have to be physical. Violence need only
symbolize the threat of future abuse in order to keep the victim in fear and control her behavior..
. In fact, physical abuse may only be utilized by abusers who are too unsophisticated to be able
to control their victims with verbal or sexual violence.
27

Id. (internal citations omitted).
28 1 am alluding here to Mari Matsuda's sering insight: "The kinds of injuries and harms
historically left to private individuals to absorb and resist through private means is no
accident. The places where the law does not go to redress harm have tended to be the places
where women, children, people of color, and poor people live." Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2321-22
(1989).
29 Given the importance of fully contextualizing women's experiences of battering, it
should be noted that each of the victims providing the narrative accounts that follow was
physically abused by the batterer. For a discussion of the significance of physical violence
in the context of criminalizing domestic violence, see infra notes 360-64 and accompanying
text.
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He used to fine me if I said anythin§ considered out of order. All these sort of weird
things, trying to get control, power.
He almost burnt my work one time-three years of research and writing. He had lots
burning. I had to beg and
of my papers out in the garden and the incinerator was
him. 3 1
plead and agree to various conditions to get it off
Within a couple of weeks, he started snarling at me about the way I laid the breakfast
table. It was something stupid like the marmalade on the wrong side of the table... I
got to the stage of wondering about everything, if I was going to get it right or
32
wrong.
Things really started to go down hill when I went to university, there's no doubt about
that.... I don't think there'd been any need for him to be violent to me [to that point
in the relationship] because he had33 me so much in his control in other ways,
financially, at home with the children.
He would say things like "It took all my self-control last night not to get the bread
knife and come upstairs and knife ou." I never knew how far he could go. I just
knew that I was in fear for my life."
He always found something wrong with what I did, even if I did what he asked. No
matter what it was. It was never the way he wanted it. I was either too fat, didn't
cook the food right .... I think he35wanted to hurt me. To hurt me in the sense ... to
make me feel like I was a nothing.
The physical stuff was bad though, but I think the silences were worse. They were
psychological torture. You could never predict what would send him into one of these
36
silences. Or how to get him out of them. These silences were the ultimate control.

Discussions of battering relationships contained in the case

law

generally reflect a far less textured understanding of the abusive dynamic.3 7

30

Liz KELLY, SURVIVING SEXUAL VIOLENCE 129 (1988). Liz Kelly's study of a range of

sexual violence, based on interviews with sixty women, is a rich source of first-hand
accounts of battering.
"' Id. at 129-30.
32 Id. at 131.
13 Id. at 129.
34 Id. at 133.
35 Fischer et al., supra note 6, at 2117 (quoting Karla Fischer, The Psychological Impact
and Meaning of Court Order of Protection for Battered Women (1992) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign) (on file with Karla Fischer)) (text of
interview conducted with one of eighty-three battered women seeking court protection from
their abusers).
36 CHARLOTTE

FEDDERS

& LAURA ELLIOT,

SHATTERED

DREAMs: THE

STORY

OF

92-93 (1987). Fedders's account of her seventeen-year marriage
contains vivid descriptions of non-physical, as well as brutal physical, abuse.
CHARLOTTE FEDDERS
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And yet the law is not wholly impermeable to the fuller accounts of
victims. 38 Descriptions of the non-physical facets of battering can be found
in the fissures of appellate decisions.3 9 For instance, the law concerns itself
with what led a woman named Judy Norman to kill her husband John, 40 and
so broadens its focus to include the following facts about a batterer's
domination:
John Norman asked Judy Norman to make him a sandwich; when Judy brought it to
him, he threw it on the floor and told her to make him another. Judy made him a
second sandwich and brought it to him; John again threw it on the floor, telling her to
put something on her hands because he did not want her to touch the bread. Judy
made a third sandwich using a paper towel
to handle the bread. John took the third
41
sandwich and smeared it in Judy's face.

Victims of domestic violence often identify non-physical abuse as a
critical component of the battering dynamic. Indeed, "some battered
women have described psychological degradation and humiliation as the
'
most painful abuse they have experienced.A
Manifestations of power and
control in the battering relationship, regardless of whether they are physical

7 See infra Part II.C.
3 We will see that these stories penetrate to varying degrees at systemic "pressure
points"; that is, sites where legal doctrine has proved sufficiently malleable to accommodate
imperfectly the incoming, incompatible realities of domestic violence. See infra Part IV.
39 See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 35-36:
Ironically, the most complete description of women's suffering from domestic violence has
entered our case law and legal literature at the point where violence against women finally harms
men-when battered women kill in self-defense. . . .Expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome was developed by feminist litigators and psychologists to explain the experiences of
abused women and the way women were affected by abuse.
Id.

In this case, Judy Norman was tried for the murder of her husband. A victim of brutal
battering over the course of the marriage, Judy Norman was not permitted to argue selfdefense to the jury despite having presented abundant evidence relevant to justification. The
trial court's refusal to instruct on self-defense was overturned by the Court of Appeals, 366
S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), which was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, 378 S.E.2d 8, 57 (N.C. 1989). Judy Norman was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter and her sentence was ultimately commuted by the Governor. For a discussion
of the case and a critique of the Supreme Court's holding, see Mahoney, supra note 12, at 8993. See generally Victoria F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing CriminalLaw Defenses, 151 U. PA.
40

L. REV. 1691 (2003).

41 State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). Note that under existing
criminal law statutes, which decontextualize battering, this behavior could not be prosecuted.
See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (describing transactional model of crime); Part
III.A (applying criminal law paradigms to case of Molly and Jim). Viewed in isolation, the
conduct is both lawful and incomprehensible. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing function of
motive in criminal trial).
42 Fischer et al., supra note 6, at 2123.
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in nature, harm victims. 43 This injury, uniquely suffered by battered
women, is not redressed by law.
B. CRIMINALIZATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The failure of criminal law to remedy domestic violence is best
understood in historical context. So viewed, this failure is neither atypical
nor coincidental, but rather one of many tangible proofs of the oft-quoted
proposition that "criminal law is, from top to bottom, preoccupied with
male concerns and male perspectives.
The evolution of sociolegal conceptions of battering is well
chronicled.45 My intention is not to revisit this complex narrative in its
entirety, but rather to employ it to situate (in time and social space) the
limitations of the current legal regime.
Ambivalence surrounding
criminalization efforts has enduring roots in the Anglo-American common
law, which until the late nineteenth century "structured marriage to give a
husband superiority over his wife in most aspects of the relationship. ' 46
This structurally sanctioned superiority encompassed the husband's right to
"command his wife's obedience, and subject her to corporal punishment or
'chastisement' if she defied his authority. 41 Integral to law's construction
of the marital relationship was its defense of hierarchy, of which physical
abuse was but one component.
The formal demise of the chastisement right in the late nineteenth
century48 foretold the criminalization of domestic violence. By 1920 all
43 "[T]he

unique profile of the 'battered woman' arises as much from the deprivation of
liberty implied by coercion and control as it does from violence-induced trauma." Stark, RePresenting Woman Battering,supra note 14, at 986; see also Kelly, supra note 30, at 130
("Many of the women in this study also stressed the atmosphere of threat and fear in which
they lived and the impact of mental violence on them."). In the words of one battered
woman interviewed by Liz Kelly:
It's like a drip on your head .... And I got to believe by the end that I was hopeless at
everything, that everything he said about me was actually true. Which is another reason why I
didn't leave, because if I was that hopeless how on earth was I going to exist on my own without
him .... That's the ploy of course.

Id. at 131.
44 Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
2151,2151 (1995).
45 For thorough scholarly accounts critiquing the historical response to domestic
violence, see generally LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND
HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as

Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
46 Siegel, supra note 45, at 2122.
47 Id. at 2123.
41 Id. at 2129.
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states had made wife beating illegal.49 Yet, as Reva Siegel writes: "[I]t
would be misleading to look to the repudiation of chastisement doctrine as
an indicator of how the legal system responded to marital violence....
[D]uring the Reconstruction era, jurists and lawmakers vehemently
condemned chastisement doctrine, yet routinely condoned violence in
marriage."5 °
Ultimately the rhetoric of marital privacy grew to take the place of a
chastisement prerogative explicitly grounded in hierarchical norms. 51 Until
recently, privacy-based rationales for non-intervention in domestic crimes
saturated the criminal justice system at all levels-police, 52 prosecutor 3 and
bench.54 Confronting a legal apparatus wholly unresponsive to battering,
domestic violence advocates focused their reform efforts, quite sensibly, on
forcing police and prosecutors to enforce the laws already on the books; 55
that is, to treat crimes "equally" whether the victim and perpetrator were
strangers or intimates. 56 Proponents of mandatory arrest and "no drop"

49 Hanna, supra note 5, at 1857.

50Siegel, supra note 45, at 2130.
51 Id. at 2150-74; see infra notes 355-59 and accompanying text (discussing continuing
power of privacy discourse in contemporary criminal law debates).
52 See generally Hanna, supra note 5, at 1857 ("Prior to the 1970s, the typical police
response to domestic violence was to mediate the situation; advising the husband or
boyfriend to 'take a walk around the block' was often the extent of police intervention.");
Zorza, supra note 1,at 47 ("Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, officers believed and
were taught that domestic violence was a private matter, ill-suited to public intervention.").
53 "For battered women and their advocates, prosecutors' offices have often been a major
impediment to improving the overall response of the criminal justice system. Indeed, some
prosecutors admit that they simply do not take domestic violence as seriously as other
crimes." Naomi Cahn, Innovative Approaches to the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Crimes: An Overview, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE
290 (Eva Schlesinger & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992); see also Hanna, supra note 5, at 186061 ("[P]rosecutors may also resist pursuing cases because they believe that battering is a
minor, private crime.").
5'See, e.g., People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981). Brown upheld the
constitutionality of Colorado's martial rape exemption based on "the legitimate state interest
in encouraging the preservation of family relationships" and a desire to "avert[ ] difficult
emotional issues and problems of proof inherent in this sensitive area." Id. at 1027.
55 Marital rape is the exception to this generalization. Not until 1990 was marital rape
considered a crime in every state. Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon?:
Demythologizing Spousal Rape and Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV.
677, 681-82 (1996). Even now, in a majority of states the criminal justice system treats
marital rape differently than non-marital rape. Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A
Legal Historyof MaritalRape, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (2000).
56 See Zorza, supra note 1,at 53 (In the 1970s, "it became clear that [advocates] needed
to concentrate their efforts on forcing the police to enforce the few laws that did exist to help
battered women."); Hanna, supra note 5, at 1860-6 1:
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prosecution policies57 argued that constraining law enforcement discretion
would tend to result in fuller enforcement of existing substantive criminal
laws. 5
In sociolegal context this strategy seems eminently reasonable. 9 And
to a significant degree it has proven successful-if success is defined, at
least in part, as forcing criminal justice system actors to apply existing laws
to domestic violence. Yet the evolution of criminal law's response to
battering is incomplete. As we will see, legal paradigms in place when
chastisement was a right are still intact, functioning effectively to negate the
quintessentially patterned practice of battering.
Operation of these
paradigms must be confronted if the criminal justice system is to move to
the next stage of reform.
C. CRIMINAL LAW PARADIGMS
Laws applied to prosecute domestic violence 60 are generally
characterized by a narrow temporal lens and a limited conception of harm.

Once police started to arrest alleged batterers, advocates began to focus reform efforts on
prosecution practices. Prosecutors often fail to initiate charges and to follow through with
criminal prosecution in domestic violence cases....
Within the past ten years domestic violence
advocacy groups have urged prosecutors to follow through with legal intervention.

Id.
57 As Cheryl Hanna suggests:
The term "no-drop" is something of a misnomer.
Pro-prosecution policies are often
characterized as either "hard" or "soft" no-drop policies. Under "hard" policies, cases proceed
regardless of the victim's wishes when there is enough evidence to go forward ....
Under soft
policies, prosecutors do not force victims to participate in the criminal process; rather, victims
are provided with support services and encouraged to continue the process.

Hanna, supra note 5, at 1863 (citations omitted).
58 See Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police
Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 308-09 (1993); Hanna, supra note 5;
Zorza, supra note 1, at 48-50; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 184-88.
" Cf. SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 182 (discussing ambivalence with which many
feminist legal reformers viewed state).
60 Traditional crimes that apply to episodic domestic violence include assault, battery,
burglary, trespass, disorderly conduct, property destruction, harassment, violation of a
restraining order, intimidation of a witness, kidnapping, homicide, rape, sexual assault, and
an attempt to commit any of these crimes. See CLARE DALTON AND ELIZABETH M.
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 564-65 (2001). Even where state legislation
has ostensibly targeted domestic violence directly, statutes have essentially replicated
already-existing structures for criminalizing violence. See, e.g.. Neal Miller, A Review of
State Domestic Violence-Related Legislation: A Law Enforcement and Prosecution
Perspective, INST.
FOR
LAW
AND
JUSTICE
(2000),
available at
http://www.ilj.org/dv/dvvawal.html (reviewing state legislation related to domestic
violence).
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Together these paradigms obscure defining aspects of battering: ongoing
patterns of power and control are not addressed; 6' nor is the full measure of
injury that these patterns inflict redressed.62
Statutes criminalizing violence do not account for the perpetration of
continuing acts. Paradigmatic crimes are "transaction-bound," embodying
principles "fundamental to our traditional law of crimes, criminal procedure
and evidence. 63 At common law, crime was conceived as occurring at a
discrete moment, and this template endures. 64 The incident-focused
criminal law contemplates "an act or omission... taking place in an instant
of time so precise that it can be associated with a particular mental state or
intention. 65 A constricted temporal frame places patterns of abuse outside
of criminal law's reach: 66 the law does not touch the pattern of conduct, for
it cannot be captured by a moment in time.67
It should by now be evident that this common-law tradition is inimical
to criminalization of the full spectrum of battering conduct. 68 Non-physical
manifestations of power and control that characterize the abusive
relationship are simply not recognized by the criminal law. The full extent
of battering's harm is inflicted over time, yet crimes of violence are
69
generally contingent on physical injury or the imminent threat of it.
61 See supra Part II.A.
62
63

See supra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
Gerald E. Lynch, Rico: The Crime of Being a Criminal,Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L.

REv. 927, 932 (1987). Though exceptions to the transaction-bound model of crime exist, see
infra notes 322-39 and accompanying text, its normative power must nonetheless be
confronted.
64 Lynch, supra note 63, at 933.
65 id.
66 See infra note 95 (describing statutes defining assault).
67 Cf Victoria F. Nourse, Law's Constitution: A Relational Critique, 17 Wis. WOMEN'S
L.J. 23, 34 (2002) for a critique of criminal law's treatment of time in the context of battered
women's self-defense claims. Nourse writes:
There seems no more 'natural' concept used by the law than time. Few lawyers however would
stop to consider 'time' a legal concept. And, yet, if one thinks about it for more than a moment,
time does play quite a common role in the law. And, in my field, the criminal law, time has
come, quite literally, to construct the debate about women and the law of self-defense.
Id.
68

Juxtapose the transaction-based, incident-focused criminal law template with this

assertion by Elizabeth Schneider: "Defining battering as part of an ongoing continuum is
essential. .... [li]t is more inclusive and accurate to the experience of women in relationships
with battering men; this definition recognizes that physical abuse does not exist in isolation."
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularityand Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and
Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520, 538 (1992).
69 In contrast to the spectrum of harm that results from battering, paradigmatic violence
against strangers inflicts paradigmatic physical injury to its victims. Cf id. at 536 (despite
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Systemic blindness to conduct perpetrated on an ongoing basis disappears
the injury that results from unseen patterns. In this manner, law's
transactionalization of crime effectively functions to legalize non-physical
battering behavior.7 °
Even where multiple episodes of physical violence are charged in a
single indictment or complaint,7' law disregards the space between these
incidents, using physicality alone to ascribe meaning. By isolating and
atomizing violence in intimate relationships, law renders context
meaningless.72 In theory and in practice this decontextualization is of
critical importance. As we have seen, relationship provides the terrain on
which a batterer's system of domination is enacted; 74 relationship is
feminists' recognition that "male domination within the martial relationship" is integral to
woman abuse, "the early articulation of the experience of battered women and the translation
of that experience into a legal concept [emphasized] the physical dimension of the abuse...
because society was more willing to redress real, physical hurt"). Viewed in historical
context, law's failure to account for non-physical injury suffered largely by women is
unsurprising. See supra Part II.B.
70 See infra Part V.A.
In most jurisdictions, very little if any non-physical abuse is
defined by statute as criminal. There may be sound prudential reasons not to criminalize this
conduct taken in isolation. It is the law's failure to recognize and distinguish circumstances
under which this conduct cannot be understood in isolation that is, in my view, problematic.
71 The prosecution of multiple offenses in a single trial is governed by criminal
procedure rules on pleading. For a summary of rules governing specificity, which generally
require that an indictment refer to an event as having occurred 'on or about' a certain date,
see WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3(b) (4th ed. 2004). For
discussion of rules governing severance, see, e.g., Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 91
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding that separate crimes must be severed unless evidence of each
would be admissible in trial of the other or evidence of each crime is "simple and distinct"
from the other). In practice, the application of these procedural rules to the prosecution of
domestic violence cases often raises important litigable issues.
72 Law's obfuscation of context is multi-dimensional. Martha Mahoney observes
that
law is:
[Flocus[ed] on the experience of individuals, stripping away the societal context of oppression
and hiding the ways in which a relationship between individuals in a particular case is similar to
other abusive relationships. Law especially emphasizes acts of physical violence, and this
emphasis in turn hides broader patterns of social power, patterns of power within a given
relationship, and complexity in the woman's life, needs, and struggles.

Mahoney, supra note 3, at 60. In this Article, recognizing that patterns of power overlap and
interact, I am concerned particularly with criminal law's shrouding of relationship-context
(what Mahoney refers to above as "patterns of power within a given relationship").
73 For a more thorough discussion of the consequences of relying on existing criminal
law structures to remedy domestic violence, see infra Part Ill.
74 The intimacy of the relationship between perpetrator and victim in domestic violence
cases thus subverts application of an "equal treatment" model of prosecution. See infra Part
VIBI. The extent to which prosecutorial decision making should reflect the unique
positionality of domestic violence victims-in relation to both the batterer and the state-has
been explored by others and is outside the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note
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essential to grasping the full measure of harm inflicted by the abuser and
suffered by the victim; 75 relationship connects and organizes what might
otherwise appear to be random acts.76
This legal discounting of non-transactional realities has important
evidentiary implications. 77 In law, what gives life to a substantive criminal
statute is the evidence that bears on its proof. Doctrinally, evidence is
relevant only if it supports a factual proposition "of consequence" to the
determination of the legal action.
Put differently, the elements of a
crime-defined statutorily-dictate what is (and is not) meaningful from a
criminal justice perspective.
Relevance in turn depends on a
decisionmaker's particular worldview, itself deeply embedded in a social
context.79
The doctrinal tensions raised by evidence of "prior acts" of domestic
violence will be examined in Part Four.80 Here it is sufficient to observe
that criminal law's failure to recognize patterns of power and control is
compounded by the evidentiary prohibition on proof of "character ' 81 or
disposition. Structured to remedy paradigmatic violence between strangers,
law negates context. 82
We have seen that basic features of existing criminal law structures are
in deep tension with remediation of battering.83 We turn now to consider
the contours of this breach.
5 (for a comprehensive discussion of the issues surrounding no-drop policies). I wish to
emphasize instead the failure of substantive criminal law to account for relationship.
75Cf Schneider, supra note 68, at 546 (characterizing what she calls "'broad'
descriptions of battering as attempting to capture interrelated aspects of coercion, power, and
control ... not limited to physical abuse").
76 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing proof of motive in criminal prosecutions of
batterers).
71See infra Part IV.A.
78 FED. R. EvID. 40
1.
79This dependence has been an important focus of the feminist critique of evidence law.
See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, The Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from
the Evidence Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 914, 924 (1994); Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in
Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 131 (1996);
Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 413,430-35 (1991).
80 See infra Part IV.
81 See infra note 149.
82 See supra note 69.
83 Analogous structural critiques of the criminal justice system's treatment of time and
context have been articulated by feminists commenting on the doctrine of self-defense as
applied to battered women who kill. For instance, Martha Mahoney urges a broadening of
the relevant temporal lens in prosecutions of batterers who kill their victims. Mahoney notes
that "a short time frame favors men in these cases, as it does in many types of cases, by
removing violence from a context of power and control." Mahoney, supra note 12, at 79.
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III. CONTOURS OF THE BREACH
A. THE CASE OF MOLLY AND JIM

To fully appreciate the limitations of the current statutory regime, it is
helpful to consider the movement of a domestic violence case through the
criminal justice system.

Because appellate decisions (and even trials

84
themselves) reflect legal structures that distort the reality of battering thus inevitably reproducing those structures-we will examine the real lives

of a batterer and his victim as they hypothetically encounter the criminal
85
process.
Jim and Molly were married less than a year after they met,86 and Jim
began raping and beating Molly within the year.87 Throughout the course of
the relationship, Molly was relentlessly subjected to Jim's domination,
which functioned as the omnipresent backdrop to escalating physical abuse.

Power and control were central to the battering dynamic. Molly was not
permitted to go outside unless Jim was present.88 He forbade her to talk to
the neighbors. 89 He did not allow her to write to her family. 90 He warned

her that if she ever tried to end their relationship, he would "see to it that
she never managed to leave with the baby." "He would take the rifle down

Jodi Armour suggests that:
[W]omen's self-defense work presses criminal law doctrine to depart from its dominant tendency
to focus narrowly on the criminal incident. Specifically, women's self-defense work presses
criminal law doctrine to broaden its time frame to take account of earlier events leading up to the
criminal incident.... Moreover, woman's self-defense work presses criminal law doctrine to
consider the contextual obstacles to a woman leaving a battering relationship ....

Jody Armour, Just Deserts: Narrative, Perspective, Choice and Blame, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
525, 527-28 (1996). See generally V. F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1235 (2001).
84 See infra discussion at Part III.B.
85 The relationship between Molly and Jim is documented by Angela Browne in her

description of interviews with women charged with killing or attempting to kill their
batterers. Browne's powerful account provides a wealth of information about the patterns of
violence in intimate relationships. See generally ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED
WOMEN KILL (1987). For a discussion of the importance of victims' narratives in the context
of legislative reform, see generally Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The

Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243, 125359 (1993). See also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV 971
(1991) (advancing a methodological critique of feminist narrative scholarship).
86 BROWNE, supra note 85, at 38.
87 Id. at 39.
85 Id. at 56.
89

id.

90 Id.
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from the wall when she was quiet for too long."9' Sexual abuse occurred
"almost nightly. 9
After years of abuse law enforcement intervenes.93 Jim attacks Molly
94
after finding her talking to a neighbor when he returns from work,
punching her repeatedly in the face, causing bruising, swelling and pain. A
neighbor calls 911 and the police respond. As is typical, the police observe
relatively minor injuries to Molly and place Jim under arrest for the
misdemeanor crime of assault.9 5
What has Jim done to Molly over the course of their relationship that is
defined as criminal by our justice system? Or, to ask the question in
slightly different form, which aspects of Molly's suffering are deemed
worthy of remediation?
Because law's constricted temporal lens does not see patterns of nonphysical abuse, Jim's on-going scheme of domination is not illegal.
Criminal statutes fail to reach battering behavior that defies capture in a
moment in time; Jim is charged by the prosecutor with misdemeanor assault
only.
When Jim appears before a judge or magistrate for arraignment, the
judicial officer must determine whether bail is appropriate. 96 This decision
9' Id. at

89.

92 Id. at 91.
For a more complete discussion of sexual abuse and rape in battering
relationships, see id. at 95-103. See also KELLY, supra note 30, at 130 (noting that "the link
between violence and forced sex has seldom been discussed in studies of domestic
violence").
A thorough exploration of the criminal justice system's response to marital rape and
other sexual crimes perpetrated by intimates is beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally Eskow, supra note 55; Hasday, supra note 55. However, it is important to
emphasize the extent to which the batterer's need for power over his victim often manifests
itself in sexually assaultive or sexually coercive acts. Regardless whether the law defines
these acts viewed in isolation as criminal, in the domestic violence context they should be
understood as an integral component of the battering scheme. See infra Part II.A for a fuller
description of domestic violence as a course of conduct.
93 Here the account departs from reality. In actuality, law enforcement intervened only
after Molly killed Jim and was charged with his murder. BROWNE, supra note 85, at 133-34.
Jim had battered Molly for six years. Id.
94In fact this did provoke one of Jim's assaults. See id. at 90-9 1.
95"A person is guilty of assault if he attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another." MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(a) (2002). There is
of course considerable intra-jurisdictional variation in criminal law statutes. See, e.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 120.00(1) (McKinney's 2002) (a person is guilty of misdemeanor assault
when "with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such
person or to a third person").
96A primary purpose of bail is to ensure the defendant's return to court. See Stack
v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,4 (1951).
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is based largely on the seriousness of the charges facing Jim. 97 The
seriousness of the offense charged dictates the maximum sentence facing
the defendant, which should impact the judge's assessment of the need for
bail to secure the defendant's return to court.98 The arraigning judge knows
only that Jim has assaulted Molly on this one occasion and that Molly has
sustained misdemeanor level injuries, subjecting Jim to misdemeanor level
penalties. In some jurisdictions, the judge may also consider Jim's potential
for dangerousness in deciding whether bail should be set. 99 But unless Jim
has previously been convicted of a crime against Molly, the arraignment
judge may have no information about Jim's long history of abuse, including
his many threats to kill. The bail determination will be made accordingly.
When the prosecutor meets with Molly to discuss the case against
Jim,' 00 the content of the interview is framed by the statutory definition of
the crime of assault. The prosecutor assesses the strength of the case by
focusing on how each element of the crime charged will be proven-and on
defeating any possible defenses-should the case ultimately go to trial.
What happened in the time period immediately preceding the incident is
relevant to the prosecutor; what happened in the weeks, months or years
preceding it is not.'0 '
The prosecutor does not learn about the continuum of battering; about
Jim's ways of isolating Molly; 0 2 about the devastating physical abuse that

97 For discussion of pretrial release procedures, see generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note
71, § 12.1(b). "Judges are inclined to give primary consideration to the seriousness of the
offense charged, most likely because it is a factor which is clearcut and easy to apply." Id.
98 Cahn, supra note 53, at 165.
99 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(b) (West 2003) (stating that judicial officer should release a
defendant on his personal recognizance unless the officer "determines that such release will
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of
any other person or the community"). State rules governing the bail determination vary
widely. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 71, at § 12.1(b). See, e.g., David J. Molton, Protecting
Domestic Violence Victims in Bail Determinations, 232-2 N.Y. L.J. 4 (July 2, 2004)
(discussing proposed legislation allowing judges to consider past intimidation and threats
against the victim when setting bail in domestic violence cases).
100 This initial meeting may take place at various stages in the criminal process,
depending on jurisdiction and office policy. The uncooperative victim and related
prosecutorial strategies are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Cahn, supra note
53, at 165-68; Hanna, supra note 5.
1' Despite the fact that criminal charges will not encompass the full spectrum of
battering conduct, a domestic violence prosecutor who is well-trained, experienced and
committed to effective handling of these cases will nevertheless question the victim
regarding the entire relationship. See infra Part IV for discussion of legal structures that
allow prosecutors to litigate the legal relevance of the battering relationship.
102For instance, Jim wouldn't allow Molly to leave the house or write to her family.
BROWNE, supra note 85, at 56.

DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER

[Vol. 94

occurred regularly;' °3 about the threats to kill Molly and her family; °4 about
the on-going sexual abuse;'0 5 about the time Jim sheared Molly's hair off,
scraping her scalp with the blades, saying "[n]o
one will look at you now,
'' 6
will they? No one will ever want you now. 0
In response to questions from the prosecutor about the particular
incident that is the basis for the pending criminal charge, Molly will not
likely volunteer a fuller account of the abuse. Molly understands that the
prosecutor is interested in this one time. And even were she inclined to
attempt to move the prosecutor outside of the charging framework, how
could Molly possibly detail the inexorably linked dynamics of power,7
control and violence that have dominated her life for the past six years?
'03 Id. at 57. The following incident occurred after Jim came home early one day and
"caught" Molly outside talking to a female neighbor:
Jim flew into a rage. He told her to put the baby down. Then he began hitting her with his fists,
throwing her against cabinets and appliances, knocking her to the floor, pulling her up, and
hitting her again. He pulled one small cabinet completely off the wall, breaking the glasses, and
threw everything in the kitchen that was movable. ...Finally, Jim dragged Molly into the living
room and demanded that she take off all her clothes. He put them in the fireplace, and then got
her clothes from the closet and added those to the pile, saying she wouldn't be needing them if
she was going to be a whore. He yelled and yelled at her about being outside, saying he would
teach her not to do that; screaming, biting, pinching, pulling hair, kicking her in the legs and
back. Molly held her breath and prayed it would be over soon. This time, she was not sure she
could make it through. This time, she thought she might die.
Id. at 90.
104 "Jim warned that [Molly's] parents' home would be the first place he would go
if he
came home and found her gone; he said he would see them die first and then kill her." Id. at
57. Jim sometimes threatened Molly "with the revolver he kept in the pick-up---holding it to
her head and saying that he didn't love her, that she wasn't good enough for him." Id. at 58.
'05 Id. at91.

[S]exual abuse occurred almost nightly. Molly's bite marks and cuts became permanent scars.
When he had been drinking, sex would go on for hours because he couldn't climax. Jim would
blame Molly for that, grinding his teeth, banging her head against the headboard and choking
her. He also threatened her or traced on her with a fillet knife during sex.
Id.
'06Id.

at 90-91.

107The following incident shows how power and control, fused with physical violence,

sex and relentless threat, circumscribed and embedded Molly's life. Jim came home from a
date at about 3 a.m.:
He didn't say much when he walked in, but seemed angry. He went to the refrigerator to get
something to eat, but then came back and knocked Molly against the wall and threw a chair at
her. Still without speaking, he jerked her to her feet and slammed her backward into a partition.
Molly's back broke through the plasterboard, and she came to on the floor with Jim pouring
water over her. He told her to get up and fix his supper, but then changed his mind and made her
sit in a chair while he lectured her instead. He was angry that she wasn't young and beautiful
like the women he was dating, that she was not a virgin anymore, that she had had a child. As he
talked, he kicked Molly in the legs; then he threw a knife at her, which missed. Jim picked up
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To whatever extent she does describe the various facets of Jim's scheme to
subordinate her, the prosecutor's responses are unlikely to inspire
confidence in the criminal justice system: that's not what he's charged
with here (meaning that her experience has no significance in the eye of
law); or, that's not a crime (meaning that what he did to her is in fact legal).
Perhaps Molly discloses past physical violence that is criminal and the
prosecutor is willing to consider additional charges. But Jim cannot be
prosecuted unless Molly knows the approximate date of the crime and is
certain that she is accurately recalling the details of one particular incident
(rather than distilling multiple incidents to a prototype).'0 8 The patterned,
on-going nature of domestic violence makes this is an often insurmountable
obstacle.' 0 9 Given the dynamics of what has been endured, it is not
surprising that domestic violence victims tend to blend, generalize and
summarize when narrating a history of abuse.' 0
To ask the battering victim to isolate and recount with precision each
incident of physical abuse--even assuming the theoretical possibility of
cohering such a thoroughly decontextualized account-is to preordain
failure. A legal system requiring this conceals that which is sufficiently
ubiquitous to become indistinct.

the knife and slowly cut x's across Molly's hand, talking all the while about how ugly she had
become. Then he told her to bandage it up and make supper.
Molly started to move around the kitchen, but Jim thought she was not hurrying enough. He
threw her back in the chair and hit her in the head with his fist. Molly tried to get up and run, but
she was too dizzy. Holding her head, Jim began hitting her face with his hand, over and over,
stopping to pour water on her from a pan whenever she seemed to be passing out. Finally he let
her fall, and when she landed face forward, he stomped on her back with his foot. Something
snapped, and Jim heard it and quit. It was daylight, but he stayed in the kitchen until Molly
managed to prepare food for him. Afterward, he wanted sex.

Id. at 92-93.
08 See supra note 71 for reference to pleading specificity requirements. In determining
whether to go forward with a particular charge, the prosecutor must also consider the state's
burden of proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
109 Ironically, relationships most characterized by on-going and relentless abuse tend to
present the greatest challenges from a charging perspective. The prosecutor is unlikely to be
able to charge separate incidents where, for instance, a defendant sexually abuses his victim
"almost nightly." See supra note 105.
"o For instance, "sometimes" when Molly bent down to pull Jim's boots off he would
kick her across the room. BROWNE, supra note 85, at 92. Angela Browne's account
continues: "Molly tried to protect herself during such attacks, but she didn't cry or scream.
She would just concentrate on her breathing and wait for it to be over. Jim got angry and
said she wasn't feeling enough pain; sometimes, he hit her hard, but Molly remained silent."
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cloaking

has important

consequences. It affects the charges that may be brought;".' the likelihood
that an offer will be made on the case;" l2 the sentence that will be
recommended to the judge on a plea;" 3 and, if the case goes to trial, the
evidence and arguments that will be presented to judge and jury."l 4 In
short, the criminal law's failure to account for an ongoing pattern of
violence severely constrains the prosecutor's ability to do justice in these

cases."' Understanding the operation of these constraints is critical to a
"from the ground" perspective on the breach between law and the lives of
battered women.
B. TRIAL

What is the impact of the disconnect between life and law on a case
that reaches the trial stage of the criminal process? 1 6 I contend that
acquittals in domestic violence cases occur more frequently than they
should, largely as a result of the law's failings. 1 7 More specifically,

1 See Cahn, supra note 53, at 166 for discussion of the charging decision.
112 An "offer" is an agreement on the part of the prosecutor to allow the defendant to
plead guilty to a charge or charges less serious than the top count, or most serious charge,
pending against him. See infra note 116 (citing statistic on plea percentages).
113 Whether a defendant was convicted by guilty plea or by jury, a judge's sentencing
discretion is of course constrained by the upper and lower limits defined by the statute under
which the defendant was convicted.
114 See infra Part III.B (discussing trial stage of criminal proceedings).
15 "The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."
ABA, ABA
STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION

FUNCTION

AND DEFENSE FUNCTION

Standard No. 3-1.2(c) (1993).
116 In our criminal justice system a relatively small (and shrinking) percentage
of cases is
ultimately tried. In 1998, approximately 91% of all state cases and 95% of all federal cases
were the result of guilty pleas or pleas of nolo contendre. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 401 tbl.5.8 (1999). A recent
study of the federal court system by Marc Galanter for the American Bar Association
suggests that in 2002, less than 5% of criminal cases went to trial. Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits
Multiply, but Fewer Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at A1. The

absolute number of trials-and victims affected by their outcomes-nevertheless remains
significant. Trials are important to their participants most obviously, but also for the
function they serve as "cultural fables.., relaying their own object lessons." Aviva
Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 663, 665 (1998).
117 To the extent that this claim is empirical, its proof presents substantial methodological
challenges. Criminal acquittals will not be captured in the case law and are rarely the subject
of reported studies or academic commentary. See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The
Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1517-18
(1998) ("Sparse data exists on the number of domestic violence cases that arrive in the
criminal justice system and what happens to them once they get there."). But see Virginia E.
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juries"' wrongly acquit-that is, they acquit in cases where the defendant is
factually guilty of the crime charged-for reasons that derive from
paradigmatic criminal law structures: jurors do not believe the victim;
jurors do not see a motive for the defendant's actions; jurors are not moved
by the victim's suffering. "9 To examine these assertions, it is most helpful
to juxtapose what we know about jury decisionmaking with a description of
evidence that generally is (and is not) presented in a domestic violence trial.
1. Victim credibility
In many ways trials are about storytelling and verdicts reflect which
narrative was more persuasive to the jury. 20 "Fact finders are more likely

Hench, When Less is More-Can Reducing Penalties Reduce Household Violence?, 19 U.
HAW. L. REV. 37, 40 (1997) (citing state Penal Code Commission statistics reporting that in
Hawaii, 92% of domestic abuse cases tried by a jury resulted in acquittals, in contrast to the
approximate rate of 10% for all other criminal cases). Studies that do examine differential
outcomes in domestic violence cases typically fail to distinguish between pre-trial
convictions (pleas of guilty) and post-trial convictions. See, e.g., RICHARD R. PETERSON,
N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY RESEARCH DEPT., COMBATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN NEW

YORK CITY: A STUDY OF DV CASES INTHE CRIMINAL COURTS 7 (2003) (finding significant
disparity between conviction rates for domestic violence and non-domestic violence cases),
This mode of analysis
available at http://www.cjareports.org/reports/ressum43.pdf.
obviously precludes the drawing of statistically significant conclusions regarding post-trial
conviction rates, much less the frequency with which factually guilty defendants are
acquitted. The gap in empirical data does not, however, undermine my assertions regarding
the impact of distorted narrative on juror decision-making. See infra Part III.B.1-3.
118 Though "juror" and "fact finder" are used throughout this Article interchangeably,
domestic violence cases may be tried by judges as well as by juries.
119 Cf Mary 1. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277 (1993) for
an analysis of the ways in which stories of sexual violation are discredited by fact finders.
Coombs "assumes that fact finders frequently do not believe women's true stories of sexual
violation." She suggests that "[t]he range of 'credible' stories is narrower than the range of
true ones. It may be a useful heuristic device to think about the situations in which fact
finders discredit women's claims of sexual violation by dividing them into two categories:
'Not True' and 'So What."' Id. at 280. Coombs's "not true" category generally corresponds
to my reference to jurors not believing the victim; "so what" aligns with what I have
described as jurors being unmoved by the victim's suffering.
120 Commentators have widely remarked on this point and its significance theoretically,
rhetorically and strategically. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 119, at 288:
In all litigation, a claimant must design a story to present to the factfinder. To succeed, the fact
finder must believe the story and the believed story must include all the elements of the relevant
legal standard. I use the term 'story' deliberately. As numerous observers have recognized, fact
finders look for stories, not just discrete nuggets of fact to fit into a set of legal rules.
Id. (citations omitted); Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the
Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 559, 559 (1991) (discussing the ways in which stories
may figure prominently at trial: litigants tell stories to jurors; jurors make sense of the
evidence presented by fitting it into a story pattern; and jurors reach a verdict by arriving at a
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to believe stories that are coherent, internally consistent, plausible"'121 and
that accord with experience and cultural expectations. 122 Empirical research
into the psychology of credibility assessment has confirmed the validity of
this model of cognition. 123 Emphasizing the close nexus between narrative
coherence and perceived credibility, the United States Supreme Court has
proclaimed that "the prosecution with its burden of persuasion needs
evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story." 124
collective story); Stephen Lubet, The Trial as a Persuasive Story, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
77 (1990) ("Courts hold trials to allow the parties to persuade the judge orjury by recounting
their versions of the historical facts. Another name for this process is storytelling."); Kim
Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits and the
Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 128 (1992) (Lawyers "mobilize ordinary
storytelling practices that are present outside legal settings, in which credibility, coherence,
and plausibility are all judged against a background of common knowledge, itself shot
through with unthinking assumptions."). For other interesting understandings of the trial as
storytelling process, see Mary Becker, The Passions of Battered Women: Cognitive Links
Between Passion, Empathy and Power, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2001); Leslie
Feiner, The Whole Truth: Restoring Reality to Children's Narrative in Long-Term Incest
Cases, 87 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1385 (1997); Myrna S. Raeder, The Double Edged
Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome by and Against Batterers in Cases
ImplicatingDomestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 789 (1996).
121 Coombs, supra note 119, at 288-89.
122 See Scheppele, supra note 120, at 161 ("[T1ruth-finding is a socially situated practice.
We all have a set of interpretive conventions, practices of truth-finding, that tell us when a
particular story seems more credible than another and when one witness appears to be telling
the truth and another seems to be lying.").
123 See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991); see also Lempert, supra note
120 (summarizing psychological research on individual juror decision making and its
significance for lawyers).
In one social psychological experiment, college students were randomly divided into
two groups. Students in one group were told to relate a true episode, and students in the
other told to concoct one. A majority of the audience evaluated the truth of the story based
on story structure. See LANCE W. BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 66-90 (1981).
"The more coherent the story, which is to say the less ambiguous the story connections, the
more likely the story was to be judged true, regardless of its actual truth." Lempert, supra
note 120, at 562. Lempert, evaluating the import of the psychological literature, concludes:
"A trier presented with a jumble of facts is, in other words, less likely to find for the party
presenting those facts than a trier who receives the same factual information presented not as
a jumble but as a coherent story." Id.
124 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 190 (1997). The Court, per Justice Souter,
held that the prosecution may be required to accept a defendant's offer to stipulate to the fact
that he was previously convicted of a felony. According to the Court, the introduction of
evidence about the nature of Johnny Lynn Old Chief's prior offense in a prosecution under
the "felon in possession" statute would raise the risk of unfairly prejudicing the jury. Since
the evidence was offered solely to prove the element of prior conviction and the defendant
offered to stipulate to this element, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
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In Old Chief v. United States, the Court in dictum reaffirms the general
proposition that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case using evidence
of its choosing. The opinion evokes (unintentionally) the functioning of
jurors in domestic violence trials:
A party seemingly responsible for cloaking something has reason for apprehension,
and the prosecution with its burden of proof may prudently demur at a defense request
to interrupt the flow of evidence telling the story in the usual way. . . . People who
hear a story interrupted by gaps of abstraction may be puzzled at the missing chapters,
and jurors asked to rest a momentous decision on the story's truth can feel put upon at
being asked to take responsibility knowing that more could be said than they have
heard. A convincing tale can be told with economy, but when economy becomes a
break in the natural sequence of narrative evidence,
an assurance that the missing link
125
is really there is never more than second best.

In domestic violence trials, the governing criminal statutes themselves
dictate that the flow of evidence will be interrupted; that the natural
sequence of narrative evidence will be broken; and that vital links will
apparently be missing. Given that legal structures significantly distort what
would otherwise be the battered woman's "true" (i.e., extra-legal) narrative,
we would anticipate that the stories victims are constrained to tell in court
would hardly be persuasive to juries.126
That the practice of battering finds no descriptive outlet in law may be
fatal to the narrative coherence of the victim's account at trial. Law forces
the victim to testify in a manner that does not sound credible, for it is not
her reality. 27 Ripped from context, her account resembles something other
prosecution to admit the full record of the prior judgment for conviction of assault causing
serious bodily injury.
121 Id. at 189.
126 In this regard, Kim Lane Scheppele's analysis of the factfinder's credibility
assessment is helpful:
The attribution of truth by judges and juries depends on properties of the stories witnesses tell.
Of course, this attribution goes on against a backdrop of cultural expectations about what sorts of
stories are credible in the first place, and those expectations are dependent on visions of
normality and aberration, drawn from experience and from widely available stock
representations. But judges and juries decide whether a witness is telling the truth by evaluating
how the story is constructed rather than by working out whether the story has a 'real' referent.
Some of the properties that matter in deciding whether stories are believable include internal
consistency [and] narrative coherence .... Narratives often become their own best evidence.
Scheppele, supra note 120, at 162 (citing BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 123, at ix).
127 A domestic violence case I tried with a colleague, in which the jury acquitted the
defendant of all counts charged, effectively illustrates this dynamic. The victim, Lourdes,
had been battered by her husband throughout the many years of their marriage. He isolated
her, used her undocumented immigration status for control, humiliated her, threatened to kill
her, and physically and sexually abused her on an on-going basis. For reasons discussed,
supra Part II.C, the defendant was charged only with the physical abuse that resulted in his
arrest and the one other incident of physical violence that Lourdes could remember with
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than truth. By failing to criminalize what is quintessentially battering, the
law guts the victim's story. As we have seen, an incoherent story is an
unpersuasive story. And unpersuaded jurors are (as they should be)
acquitting defendants.
2. Defendant motive
Motive serves a unique function in a criminal trial. Since it is not a
statutory element, proof of motive is not required. 2 9 Yet evidence of
motive is always relevant 30 and, from a juror perspective, critical to making

sufficient precision. Apart from these two apparently (from the jury's perspective) isolated
incidents, she was not allowed to testify about any of the ways in which the defendant
exercised power and control over her. Lourdes' testimony was of course stilted, her account
virtually incomprehensible. Without context, the story simply did not cohere. One of the
jurors who I spoke with after the acquittal said, in words to this effect, "something about her
story just didn't seem right; she was strange." And, in the courtroom, she did seem strange.
In this case, a battered woman whose story was mangled by legal structures became
incredible.
128 "Motive" has been defined as:
Cause or reason that moves the will and induces action. . . . In common usage "intent" and
"motive" are not infrequently regarded as one and the same thing. In law there is a distinction
between them. "Motive" is said to be the moving course, the impulse, the desire that induces the
criminal action on the part of the accused; it is distinguished from "intent" which is the purpose
or design with which the act is done, the purpose to make the means adopted effective.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1014 (6th ed. 1990) (citing State v. Willis, 632 S.W.2d 63, 65
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
A batterer's desire or impulse to control his victim would seem to satisfy this
definition. However, to the extent that the concept of motive might imply, however
incorrectly, a conscious articulation that is not necessarily characteristic of the scheme to
exert power over a domestic violence victim, I use the word advisedly in this context. See
generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.6, at 241-42 (3rd ed. 2000) (noting
disagreement about the meaning of the word "motive" and how it differs from "intention,"
"a matter which has caused the theorists considerable difficulty for years"); Martin Gardner,
The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and
Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635 (1993). For further discussion of the difficulty of proving
consciousness of motive in domestic violence cases, see infra note 331 and accompanying
text.
129 A major categorical exception is for bias crimes. See Gardner, supra note 128, at
717-24.
130 LAFAVE, supra note 128, § 3.6, at 246:
[Tihe fact that the defendant had some motive, good or bad, for committing the crime is one of
the circumstances which, together with other circumstances, may lead the factfinder to conclude
that he did in fact commit the crime; whereas lack of any discernible motive is a circumstance
pointing in the direction of his innocence.
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sense of the victim's story. 13 ' As one leading teacher of trial advocacy
suggests, "[p]eople do things for a reason. Jurors want to know not only
32
what they did-the conduct-but also why they did it-the motivation."'
Jurors in domestic violence cases are typically not presented with the
evidence they need to understand the defendant's motive. Law has
decontextualized episodic physical violence from the battering relationship,
depriving jurors of critical information. Abstracted incidents are uprooted
from their place of meaning: a man beats his wife after he finds her outside
the house talking to the woman next door133-why?
In the absence of a
motive that can be causally linked to the alleged conduct, a factfinder might
well entertain a doubt-and reasonably so-about whether the conduct in
fact occurred. A jury cannot make sense of what motivates the defendant's
actions 34 without understanding that which the law masks.
This veiling of patterns of control obscures much that is relevant to the
question of "motive"-the strand weaving together seemingly disparate
mechanisms of power. Law shrouds an elaborate system of subordination,
constructed and maintained to dominate. Batterers make rules that their

131 For an interesting illustration of the importance of motive evidence to a criminal
prosecution, see John B. Mitchell, Why Should the ProsecutorGet the Last Word?, 27 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 139, 214 (2000). Mitchell's hypothetical closing argument (which he uses to make
an advocacy point) demonstrates the strategic value to the defense of unproven motive:
But of course we do not presume Mr. [Defendant] guilty, we presume him innocent. If there was
no reason for him to do something---like deliberately hit a police officer-than there is a
reasonable doubt that he did, a reason to believe it might have been an accident. And this doubt
does not disappear just because the prosecution says, "Oh, people do stupid things." She wants to
make these reasonable doubts disappear by making up explanations and excuses. You can always
do that if you presume someone guilty, and shift the burden of proof. But those reasonable
doubts stay unless there is evidence ....But the prosecution has no such evidence, so all she will
give you in rebuttal is explanation and excuses. And do not be fooled. I am not saying that the
prosecutor must prove motive, she does not. What I am saying is that if my client had no reason

to deliberately strike the officer, then there is reasonable doubt that he did.

Id. (emphasis added).
132 THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 26 (5th ed. 2000). While the importance of
motive evidence is generally understood by reference to the cognitive framework that we
have been discussing, it is also interesting to note that jurors may expect prosecutors to prove
motive beyond a reasonable doubt despite instructions to the contrary. Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
Juror Comprehension and Public Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 788, 808 (2000) (citing
study by Reifman and Ellsworth that found only 30% ofjurors who served on criminal cases
correctly understood that the prosecution does not have the burden of proving motive beyond
a reasonable doubt).
133 See supra note 103.

134Jurors may also feel a need to make sense of the victim's actions (despite the fact that
the victim is not on trial) in order to convict the defendant.
accompanying text.

See infra notes 350-52 and
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36
They force their victims to internalize these rules'
and punish rule infractions. 37 A batterer reinforces his victim's connection
to him through fear, 38 emotional abuse and social isolation. 3 9
A jury presented with evidence of isolated physical violence cannot
begin to reconstruct this complex pattern of control. Left with the "why"
question unanswered, a jury discredits the victim's account. What she's
saying makes little sense, despite the fact-indeed because of it-that her
testimony is simply conforming to legal structures that deform her story. 140
Because the batterer's desire for power finds no expression in law,
the jury in a domestic violence case is denied the evidence that would

victims must follow.

135

35

Fischer et al., supra note 6, at 2126-27:

Battered women have frequently reported that abusers are extremely controlling of the everyday
activities of the family. This domination can be all encompassing: as one of the batterers from
Angela Browne's study was fond of stating, "you're going to dance to my music ... be the kind
of wife I want you to be."

Id. (quoting BROWNE, supra note 85, at 60).
136 Id. at 2129:
As time goes by in a battering relationship ... specific rules and their attached consequences
give way to a general climate of increasingly subtle control, where the batterer needs to do less
and less to structure his family's behavior. Caught up in the day to day fight for survival, the
victims may not even be aware of this censorship process.

Id.
'13Id. at 2131:

The rules that battered women try desperately to follow become established in a pattern of
domination and control by the enforcement mechanism used by the batterer. Batterers may
either simply respond with abuse when a rule is broken, or they may make it clear that the abuse
is punishment for violations.

Id.
13'

Id. at 2131-32:

At the core of these types of systematic control and domination is the fear that battered women
have about future violence. This fear can be a result of past beatings or threats of physical or
sexual abuse. The fear may also be triggered by any verbal or nonverbal symbol associated with
the onset of an abusive incident. In some cases, threats of harm against the victim's extended
family or against her children may be as effective in controlling her behavior as physical
violence itself.

Id.

139 Id. at 2132:

Control is also maintained, and fear is intensified, through the extensive use of humiliation,
ridicule, criticism, and other forms of emotional abuse; financial abuse; and social isolation. It is
undoubtedly easier to control someone if they think less of themselves. It is difficult for victims
to leave their abusers when they do not have access to money. Similarly, limiting victims'
interactions with other people enhances the batterers' domination over the family by both cutting
off potential sources of support and by making the boundary between the family culture of
battering and the outside world more defined.
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enable it to cobble together a motive for the conduct charged. An account
of the full panoply of abuse-if allowed-would manifest a "systematic
pattern of control and domination.''
Only then would the jury be in a
position to frame a meaningful account of the defendant's scheme.
3. Jurorapathy
A vote to convict a defendant of a crime is an expression of certainty
beyond a reasonable doubt. 42 As one veteran prosecutor in the New York
County District Attorney's office often remarks, prosecutors "cannot win
the jurors' minds unless they win their hearts.' 43 Jurors presented with
evidence of domestic violence out of context will naturally care less about
the victim and what she has endured.' 44 This, in turn, makes jurors more
likely to entertain doubts about whether the
defendant's guilt has been
4
proven to the requisite standard of certainty. 1

140

Contrast this to the law's receptivity to paradigmatic motives for paradigmatic crimes

of violence-for instance, anger, jealousy and financial gain.
141 Fischer et al., supra note
6, at 2126-32.
142 This concept is elusive and seemingly impossible to define with precision. One
prominent treatise on federal pattern jury instructions explains reasonable doubt as follows:
The words almost define themselves. It is a doubt based upon reason and common sense. It is a
doubt that a reasonable person has after carefully weighing all of the evidence. It is a doubt
which would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in a matter of importance in his or her
personal life. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must ... be proof of such a convincing character
that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his
own affairs.
Leonard B. Sand et al., Modem Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 4-2, at 4-8 (2002).
143 Interview with Peter Casolaro, Assistant District Attorney,
New York County District
Attorney's Office, in New York, N.Y. Put differently, "jurors want to feel good about their
decisions, and they can't unless they learn enough about the key people to get a feel for them
and reach a verdict that is consistent with their feelings about those people." MAUET, supra
note 132, at 26.
144 Mary Coombs has made a similar observation in the context of jury evaluations of
women's stories of sexual violation, terming the category of discredited claims: "So What."
Coombs, supra note 119, at 280-81.
145 I do not mean to suggest that we want jurors to convict because they empathize with
the victim but, rather, that empathy is a sine qua non for conviction in domestic violence
cases. Nor do I assert that jurors in domestic violence return verdicts of not guilty to express
conscious disapproval with the law or its application to domestic violence. The concept of
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is sufficiently malleable that talk of jury nullification is
not necessary or particularly helpful in this context. See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); M. Kristine Creagan, Jury Nullification:
Assessing Recent Legislative Developments, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1101 (1993); Philip B.
Scott, Jury Nullification: An HistoricalPerspectiveon a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV.
389 (1989).
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The law's decontextualization of battering thus has profound
implications for jury functioning. As the Old ChiefCourt recognized,
[w]hen a juror's duty does seem hard, the evidentiary account of what a defendant has
thought and done can accomplish what no set of abstract statements ever could, not
just to prove a fact but to establish its human significance, and so to
implicate the
46
law's moral underpinnings and ajuror's obligation to sit in judgment.

In domestic violence cases, jurors obligated to sit in judgment are
presented with a narrative warped by law. The verdicts that they reach may
reflect this failing.
IV. PRESSURE ON THE BREACH

We have been considering the disconnect between battering as it is
practiced and battering as it is criminalized. This analytic framework
allows us to see particular legal rules, formal and informal, as having
developed in response to the gap between socially lived reality 147 and
criminal law. This Part explores areas of law that have been shaped at
certain "pressure points" by the incoming, incompatible realities of
domestic violence: evidentiary rulings on the admission of "prior bad acts";
expert testimony on battering and its effects; and the application of antistalking statutes to the prosecution of batterers. These pressure points are
testament to the powerful force brought to bear on legal structures by
unaccounted for experiences. Yet law's adjustments have, to this point,
been marginal: at times doctrinally incoherent; in places theoretically
untenable; in other places practically unworkable; always providing less
than a remedy for the true harm of domestic violence.

146 The fuller observation offered by the Court in Old Chief is as follows:
Evidence... has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a
narrative gains momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the
willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest
verdict. This persuasive power of the concrete and particular is often essential to the capacity of
jurors to satisfy the obligations that the law places on them. Jury duty is usually unsought and
sometimes resisted, and it may be as difficult for one juror suddenly to face the findings that can
send another human being to prison, as it is for another to hold out conscientiously for acquittal.
When a juror's duty does seem hard, the evidentiary account of what a defendant has thought
and done can accomplish what no set of abstract statements ever could, not just to prove a fact
but to establish its human significance, and so to implicate the law's moral underpinnings and a
juror's obligation to sit in judgment.
Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187-88 (1997).
147 See MacKinnon, supra note 26.
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A. LITIGATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE "HISTORY"
The law's antipathy to what is conceptualized as character evidence is
deeply rooted.

48

The prohibition on propensity evidence 149 and its rationale

have been articulated in this way:
[T]he government may not prove one or more past criminal acts in an effort to support
the inference that the accused has a bad or criminal disposition ....
Permitting this
generally forbidden line of proof would be inconsistent with the general principle that,
basically, disallows character evidence when offered for circumstantial use against the
accused. . . . In short, the forbidden line of proof invokes with full force the
considerations of distraction,
confusion of the issues, time consumption and,
50
especially, prejudice.'

Evidence of a criminal defendant's prior bad acts, it is feared, could
lead jurors to convict in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or
to engage in prohibited "propensity reasoning"-that is, to assume that if
the defendant is the type of person who has engaged in particular conduct in
the past, he is more likely to have done so on the occasion in question.15
The rule governing the admissibility of prior acts frequently results in

148

"A concomitant of the presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for

what he did, not for who he is."

United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir.

1977).

"Propensity evidence" generally refers to acts (normally prior acts) introduced as
proof of character to show action in conformity with this trait on the occasion of the litigated
dispute. The prohibition on propensity evidence is codified by Federal Rule of Evidence 404
and its state law analogues.
'50 GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.12, at 161 (3d ed.
1996) (internal citation omitted). The commentary notes that "past criminal acts" include
149

acts not resulting in a criminal conviction as well as "immoral acts." This category is
variously referred to as "bad acts," "uncharged acts" or "other acts" evidence. See also

Myrna Raeder, The Admissibility of PriorActs of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1488-89 (1996). Myrna Raeder explains the doctrinal justification
for excluding propensity evidence in this way:
[Olur criminal justice system is based on the proposition that individuals are tried only for the
crime charged-not for who they are ....
We forbid the jury to reason that if a person has
committed previous assaults, he is the type of person who would assault the victim on this
occasion, even though such propensity-based reasoning is clearly logical. As a policy matter we
have decided that the relevance of such information does not outweigh its prejudice because
jurors may be inflamed by the bad acts and ignore the otherwise weak evidence concerning the
current charges to punish the defendant for his previous wrongs. Moreover, the evidence also
puts an unfair burden on the defendant to defend against matters usually having nothing to do
with the case being prosecuted.

Id.
1i

The rule also embodies that notion that a criminal defendant facing trial is entitled to

a clean slate. People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930) ("In a very real sense a
defendant starts his life afresh when he stands before a jury .... ").
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exclusion of probative evidence 152 and leaves in its wake a doctrine that is
confused and often contradictory.
Although tension that inheres in
application of this evidentiary rule is by no means limited to domestic
violence prosecutions,' 53 in this context the resulting illogic is unique.
Given the abundance of scholarly commentary on the rules related to
character evidence, 5 4 our inquiry may be narrowly defined. We are
interested in law's struggle to reconcile its hostility to propensity evidence
with the reality of domestic violence. How has evidentiary doctrine
configured itself to account for the patterned nature of battering? As
expected, there is both movement and resistance on the part of legal
structures subjected to the force of lived experience.
Each
(movement/resistance) reveals the defects of structures left intact, the
remaining doctrinal patchwork a testament to the power of incompatible
truths.
In service of a criminal law that transactionalizes violence, the rules of
evidence mute stories of battering.
Because domestic violence is
criminalized as a discrete act or acts, the pattern itself-and all conduct
manifesting it that is not specifically charged-lies outside the domain of
the prosecution. Pieces of a whole fragmented by substantive criminal
statutes become further unmoored from their context by evidentiary
doctrine. According to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and its state law
analogues, "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity

152

However, prior acts evidence may be admitted provided that the proponent's theory

of relevance does not engage the prohibited "propensity" reasoning. See supra note 149.
153Thomas J. Leach, "Propensity" Evidence and FRE 404: A Proposed Amended Rule
With an Accompanying "Plain English" Jury Instruction,68 TENN. L. REV. 825, 827 (2001):
[A]mbivalence about the Rule and the skewed decisional reasoning it produces are a reflection of
an inherent tension within the Rule itself-tension between an acknowledgment of the factual
probativeness of other-acts evidence and a fear of its dangers in the hands of the jury. Moreover,
this tension, both in the Rule and in the courts' administration of it, leads to a dangerously
disrespected version of justice that should encourage us to look hard at a change in the Rule.

Id. For general critiques of Rule 404, see Kenneth J. Melilli, The CharacterEvidence Rule
Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1547 (1998); Roger C. Park, Characterat the Crossroads, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1998); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct.Illusion, Illogic and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845 (1982).
154"The number of law review articles on uncharged misconduct is staggering."
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1:04 (rev. ed. 1999). For

other perspectives on the workings of the rule, see Edward J. lmwinkelreid, The Dispute
Over the Doctrine of Chances, 7 CRIM. JUST. 16 (Fall 1992); David P. Leonard, In Defense of
the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by Character,73
IND. L.J. 1161 (1998). For an insightful discussion of the operation of the rule in the
domestic violence context, see Raeder, supra note 150.
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therewith."' 5 Since all conduct that is not charged becomes, by definition,
"other crimes, wrongs or acts," its admissibility is framed as a question of
"character" or "propensity."
In domestic violence cases, 404(b) litigation is the terrain on which the
battle over context is enacted. 5 6 The prosecution's motion to introduce
prior acts evidence at trial is, in effect, an assertion that the conduct charged
cannot be fully understood in isolation. 5 7 A 404(b) motion implicitly (or
explicitly) argues that for the trier of fact to function-to evaluate victim
credibility, comprehend motive and attach meaning to the behavior
alleged15 8-a more complete story than that contemplated by the criminal
law must be told. The defense, citing fundamental criminal' 5 9 and
evidentiary paradigms 60 that negate context, equates prior bad acts with
162
unfair isprejudice
or and
character
largelyassassination.
unconstrained. 63The decision of the trial
discretionary
judge

R. EvID. 404(b). "It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
Id.
mistake or accident ....
156 Again, the general exclusion of prior acts for their propensity value does not preclude
155 FED.

the admission of these same acts for another purpose. Rule 404(b) provides a nonexhaustive list of non-propensity uses of bad act evidence. Id. We will see that some courts
and legislatures have created what is expressly or functionally a domestic violence exception
to this rule. See infra notes 181-187, 190 and accompanying text.
157 See Raeder, supra note 150, at 1488.
158
159
160
161

See supra Part III.B.
See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... " FED. R. EVID. 403. "Unfair prejudice" is
defined as "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though
not necessarily, an emotional one." Id. (Advisory Committee's note).
162 See FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
163See Raeder, supra note 150, at 1494. Raeder observes:
Judicial philosophy varies dramatically concerning the true value of [prior acts] evidence.
Whether it is considered character assassination or extremely probative depends in large measure
on the judge's understanding of domestic violence. If judges do not comprehend the dynamics

of battering relationships, including common themes such as cyclical violence, control and
abusive personality, it is much easier to view prior acts as isolated and extremely prejudicial.
This ignorance reinforces misogynistic beliefs about women which fixate on their provocation,
rather than the male's intentional pattern of behavior. As a result, ajudge may exclude such
evidence entirely, severely limit the number of past acts, require them to be physically abusive in
nature or only permit acts which were close in time to the event.

Id.
Practical considerations of crowded case dockets and fear of appellate reversal may
also incentivize the trial court exclusion of prior acts evidence. I thank Assistant District
Attorney Laurence Busching, Bureau Chief of the New York County Family Violence and
Child Abuse Bureau, for clearly articulating this insight.

DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER

[Vol. 94

The extent to which judges are allowing prior acts evidence in
domestic violence prosecutions is unknown. Case law inevitably distorts
our sense of what is happening at trials, failing to capture denials of
prosecutor's 404(b) motions.' 64 What we do learn from appellate opinions
is how judges are justifying the admission of prior acts evidence in
battering cases. 165 We will see that partial accommodation of legal
structures to domestic violence "history" evidence 166 reveals the
fundamental dissonance between the transaction-based/disposition-averse
law and the practice of battering.
While the applicable legal framework varies jurisdictionally, 167 a few
general observations can be made. Prior acts of domestic violence, 168 when
admitted, are typically allowed to rebut a particular defense' 69-most often,
suicide or accident7 ° and self-defense.' 7 Within this context, trial courts

'64 Note the invisibility of this exclusion of context.
"It is virtually impossible to track
the decisions which favor the defendant because such rulings are generally not appealable by
the prosecution." Raeder, supra note 150, at 1494. Only on rare occasions does a written
decision result from a prosecutor's interlocutory appeal of a pretrial order excluding prior
acts evidence. But see, e.g., State v. Pyle, 963 P.2d 721 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming trial
court's exclusion of evidence). In my prosecutorial experience the admission of prior acts
evidence in domestic violence trials was exceptional.
165 As doctrine frames (but rarely dictates) these rulings it is simultaneously shaped by
them.
166 See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (critiquing characterization
of
domestic violence history evidence as such).
167 Compare Lisa A. Linsky, Use of Domestic Violence History Evidence
in the Criminal
Prosecution:A Common Sense Approach, 16 PACE L. REV. 73 (1995) (discussing New York
common law governing the admissibility of domestic violence history evidence) with Sarah
J. Lee, The Search For Truth: Admitting Evidence of Prior Abuse in Cases of Domestic
Violence, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 231 (1998) (focusing on Hawaii's application of the
state's rule 404(b)), and Debra Raye Hayes Ogden, ProsecutingDomestic Violence Crimes:
Effectively Using Rule 404(b) to Hold Batters Accountablefor Repeated Abuse, 34 GONZ. L.
REV. 361, 368-74 (!998-99) (commenting on Washington's 404(b) jurisprudence and
summarizing law of other select states).
168 We are concerned here with judicio-legislative treatment of prior acts of battering
against the victim in the case on trial. Admission of evidence of previous abusive
relationships lies outside the scope of this discussion. See, e.g., Wetta v. State, 456 S.E.2d
696, 699 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); see also infra note 190.
169 Within this framework, the prior acts are not independently admissible
in the
prosecutor's direct case. Instead, their admission is contingent on an assertion of a particular
defense. See Raeder, supra note 150, at 1470 (noting that "even with the most sympathetic
judge, none of this [404(b)] evidence is likely to be admissible in the government's case-inchief"). Unfortunately, the appellate case law often fails to differentiate between rebuttal
and case-in-chief use of prior acts evidence.
170 See, e.g., People v. llgen, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519-22 (11. 1991)
(evidence of the
defendant's prior unprovoked assaults on his wife admissible to negate the claim that injury
was accidental or inadvertent).
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understand the previous abuse to be evidence of motive,' 7 2 intent,"7 3 and
plan or design. 7 4 These rationales for admitting prior acts evidence accord
171 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 405 S.E.2d 33, 34 (Ga. 1991)
(evidence showing that defendant
had physically abused his wife for years, and had threatened her with weapons prior to her
murder admissible to rebut claim of self defense); People v. Hawker, 626 N.Y.S.2d 524, 525
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (evidence of defendant's prior assault of his wife admissible to rebut
claim of self-defense); State v. Hendricks, 787 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Vt. 2001) (prior domestic
assault evidence admissible to rebut defendant's self-defense claim).
172 See, e.g.,
State v. Powell, 893 P.2d 615, 624-25 (Wash. 1995) (evidence of
defendant's previous assaults against his wife, including a prior attempt to strangle her,
properly admitted to show motive for murder). In Powell, the court defined motive as "'the
moving course, the impulse, the desire that induces criminal action on part of the accused."'

Id. (quoting

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1014 (6th rev. ed. 1990)). Often, however, courts

equate motive in domestic violence cases with generalized hostility. Consider People v.
Deeney, 193 Cal. Rptr. 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1983), where a California appeals court
reversed the defendant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter. The Deeney court held
that the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of defendant's prior abuse of the victim
(his wife) to prove motive. Id. at 610. In reasoning stunningly devoid of insight into the
battering dynamic, the court explained:
[The previous abuse does not] reveal any motive to kill June. These prior events do show
Deeney mistreated June and frequently argued with her. They may even suggest Deeney
disliked his wife. However, because these events did not involve any physical attacks even
remotely capable of causing death, they do not demonstrate Deeney disliked June so intensely
that he wished her dead.
Id. at 612; see also Raeder, supra note 150, at 1495. Raeder criticizes the judicial rationale
for admitting prior acts as proof of motive. Courts allowing this evidence tend to view
previous battering as evidence of hostility and conceptualize hostility as the motive for the
violence. This is problematic given that "control is not synonymous with hostility." Id.
173 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Andrade, 661 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (Mass. 1996) (noting
that ample evidence of threats and acts of spousal abuse rendered other erroneously admitted
evidence cumulative on the issue of defendant's intent to kill); State v. Murillo, 509 S.E.2d
752, 764 (N.C. 1998) (upholding trial court's admission of other acts evidence to show lack
of accident and to support a finding of intent).
174 When offered to prove a common scheme or plan or identity, courts generally
require
a substantial degree of similarity between the prior acts and the crime charged. JOHN W.
STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190(3) (5th ed. 1999). Cf Grider v. State, 69
S.W.3d 681, 687 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that "[i]t is not enough for proponents to
argue that the evidence establishes a common scheme or plan; proponents must demonstrate
that such common scheme logically makes an elemental fact more or less probable").
Compare People v. Linkenauger, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868, 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting
People v. Miller, 790 P.2d. 1289, 1306 (Cal. 1990) (prior history evidence supports inference
that defendant committed the charged offense, as "inference of identity ... need not depend
on one or more unique or nearly unique common features; features of substantial but lesser
distinctiveness may yield a distinctive combination when considered together"), and llgen,
583 N.E.2d at 524 ("[T]he differences between the shooting incident [charged] and the prior
incidents of abuse are not so great as to eliminate the probative value of the prior abuse
evidence."), with Robertson v. State, 829 S.2d 901, 909 (Fla. 2002):
The charged and collateral offenses must be not only strikingly similar, but they must also share
some unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other
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with the traditional 404(b) framework. 7 5 Where a victim recants her
allegations at trial, courts have also allowed prior acts evidence to prove
why she might be unwilling to testify against the defendant.' 7 6 Appellate
courts affirming trial courts' exercise of discretion tend to emphasize that
the admitted evidence is relevant for a purpose "other than to show the
' 77
defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged."'
Traditional doctrinal justifications for the admission of "history"
evidence-to prove motive, intent, and the defendant's scheme or planinevitably constrict its significance. 78 The evidence is admitted 79 solely
for the purpose of establishing motive, intent, scheme, or whichever nonpropensity basis the judge prefers-and the jury is instructed not to consider
80
it for any other purpose.

offenses. In this case, the crime with which [the defendant] was charged was the completed
offense of murder against his girlfriend utilizing a handgun. The prior offense, assuming it
occurred, involved a threat of violence against [the defendant's] former wife, involving an
assault rifle. Neither the crimes, the weapons, nor the victims are similar.
Id. (internal citation omitted). See Edward J.Imwinkelried, The Plan Theory for Admitting
Evidence of the Defendant's Uncharged Crimes: A Microcosm of the Flaws in the
UnchargedMisconduct Doctrine, 50 Mo. L. REV. 1, 15 (1985).
175 See Raeder, supra note 150, at 1493.
176 See, e.g., State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194, 206-07 (Haw. 1996) (allowing prior acts as
evidence to show the relationship between the defendant and the victim where the abusive
nature of the relationship may form the basis for the victim's retraction of her allegations);
State v. Harris, 560 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Minn. 1997) (testimony regarding previous abuse
admissible where it "demonstrate[s] the degree of control exercised by [the defendant] over
[the victim] and provide[s] an explanation for her willingness to perjure herself on his behalf
at [a prior] trial"); State v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
(affirming the trial court's admission of prior acts evidence for its relevance to the victim's
recanting of her allegations at trial).
177 See, e.g., Illgen, 583 N.E.2d at 520. A limiting instruction informs the jury of the
permissible use for the admitted evidence and emphasizes that the prior acts are not to be
considered as proof of the defendant's propensity to commit domestic violence. See infra
note 185 (describing appropriate jury instruction).
178 As we have seen, incidents of domestic violence cannot be understood in isolation.
See supra Part II.A.
179 It is worth underscoring that even where prior acts of domestic violence would
seem
to fit neatly into the traditional non-propensity framework, ajudge may nevertheless exclude
the evidence. See supra note 161 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 403).
18oThe doctrinal justification for admission dictates how the jury is instructed on the
permissible uses of the evidence. See Linsky, supranote 167, at 89:
If the prosecutor is permitted to introduce domestic violence history evidence on the direct case,
the trial judge must instruct the jury as to the limited purposes for which the jury must consider
this evidence. The judge must also advise the jury that they must not consider such evidence as
probative of a criminal propensity or general bad character of the defendant.
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In contrast, some courts have explicitly recognized the importance of
context to domestic violence prosecutions and have allowed prior bad acts
to be admitted for their bearing on the relationship as a whole.' 81 This
approach, while departing from the template of traditional non-propensity
uses, 182 reflects rather a more candid appraisal of the probative value of the
evidence in this context. 83 It thus represents an alternative to the
conceptual muddle that results when the paradigmatic propensity
framework is applied to battering cases.
184
The opinion of the Vermont Supreme Court in State v. Sanders,
explicitly avowing the probative worth of context, illustrates this approach.
At issue was the trial judge's admission of two prior acts of violence in a
prosecution of the defendant for threatening his girlfriend with a knife. The
State argued that the evidence was relevant to the issue of the defendant's
intent to threaten (an element of the crime) and the victim's fear of the
defendant. The trial court admitted the evidence on the issue of intent.'
Interestingly, in upholding the admission of prior acts evidence, the
court explicitly connects domestic violence "history" to the practice of
battering:
Here, we need not decide whether the prior bad acts may be admissible solely to show
fear or intent because the evidence was relevant also to portray the history
surrounding the abusive relationship, providing the needed context for the behavior in
issue. The purpose of establishing the defendant's history of abuse of the victim, is
not to show his general character for such but to provide the jury with an
Allegations of a
understanding of the defendant's actions on the date in question ....
single act of domestic violence, taken out of its situational context, are likely to seem
'incongruous and incredible' to a jury. Without knowing the history of the

181

See, e.g., State v. Drach, I P.3d 864 (Kan. 2000); State v. Hedger, 811 P.2d 1170,

1174 (Kan. 1991) (Kansas courts have repeatedly "held that evidence of a discordant marital
relationship is admissible, independent of the [state's 404(b) analogue] to show the on-going
relationship between the parties."); State v. Elvin, 481 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) ("[E]vidence of previous domestic violence is admissible to illuminate the relationship
between defendant and victim."); People v. Shorey, 568 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991) (stating that in addition to its bearing on motive and intent, prior acts evidence also
admissible "as background material in order for the jury to understand the nature of' the
abusive relationship); State v. Sanders, 716 A.2d 11 (Vt. 1998). A few states have made
legislative changes to this effect. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
182Again, Rule 404(b) is not exhaustive.
183 Some states have amended their evidentiary codes to make prior acts evidence
presumptively admissible for non-propensity purposes in domestic violence cases. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-801.5 (2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20 (West 2002).
' 716 A.2d at 13.

185 Presumably the jury was instructed that it was only to consider the evidence of prior
abuse for its bearing on the defendant's intent to threaten the victim, and not as proof of any
criminal (or battering) disposition. See supra note 177.
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relationship between the defendant and the victim, jurors may not believe the victim
was actually abused . . . The prior occasions tend to prove that defendant meant to
threaten and intimidate his friend when he raised 186
the knife and said "someone is
gonna die." Therefore, the evidence was admissible.

The court's basic point-that "the purpose of establishing the
defendant's history of abuse of the victim, is not to show his general
character for such but to provide the jury with an understanding of the
defendant's actions on the date in question"-could be characterized as a
general description of the relevance of prior acts evidence in domestic
violence cases. That is to say, the court's proposition is true as a
categorical matter. Even in cases where the previous conduct is admissible
for a non-propensity purpose specifically allowed by the evidentiary code, it
more importantly will "provide the jury with an understanding of the
defendant's actions on the date in question.' 8 7
Why, then, the widespread judicial reluctance to embrace the probative
value of prior acts evidence for all its richness? This ambivalence is
grounded in law's antipathy to propensity reasoning. 188 The concern might
be articulated in this way: relying on the past conduct of a defendant-even
a defendant who, over the course of a relationship, controls his victim using
all manner of tactics-to assess the defendant's behavior on a particular
occasion puts us in the realm of "disposition." And this,
the argument goes,
89
cannot be squared with our criminal evidentiary law.
In response to this perceived incompatibility between the propensity
framework and truth seeking in battering prosecutions, a few states have
amended their evidentiary codes to expressly allow for the propensity use of

186 Sanders, 716 A.2d at 13. The court goes on to note that previous incidents of abuse

are also relevant to the victim's recantation at trial, recognizing that the prior history of
violence "gives the jury an understanding of why the victim is less than candid in her
testimony and allows them to more accurately decide which of the victim's statements more
reliably reflect reality." Id.
187 Id. Consider Stallworth v. State, 797 So. 2d 905, 909 (Miss. 2001) (stating that the
trial court held that evidence of past abuse "might easily show motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan ... about all of the 404(b) exceptions to allow it in").
188See infra discussion at notes 148-51 and accompanying text; cf Raeder, supra note
150, at 1503 (stating that "the mistrust of domestic violence evidence is a relic of a past in
which domestic femicides were viewed in isolation and no theory linked the prior acts to the
murder other than generalized bad character").
'89 For one formulation of this argument, see Christopher M. Joseph, Comment, Other
Misconduct Evidence: Rethinking Kansas Statutes Annotated Section 60-455, 49 U. KAN. L.
REV. 145, 187 (2000) (asserting that admission of prior acts to show "relationship, course of
conduct, or to corroborate testimony" is "often relevant only to show the defendant's
criminal disposition," thereby undermining the rationale for excluding propensity evidence).
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prior acts in domestic violence cases. 190 In these jurisdictions, jurors are
instructed that they may consider the evidence as it bears on the defendant's
disposition to commit offenses involving domestic violence.' 9' If the jury
finds that the defendant has this disposition it may, but is not required to,
infer that he was likely to commit and did commit the crime of which he is
accused.' 92
Resort to the propensity use of prior acts evidence may be understood
as an effort to legislate around law's failure to account fully for the
probative value of uncharged acts of domestic violence. This approach,
however, goes beyond what is needed while leaving intact flawed structural
paradigms. Allowing propensity-based reasoning in domestic violence
cases does not compensate for criminal justice system defects.' 93 Indeed,
conceptualizing bad acts as probative of a "disposition" to commit domestic
violence reflects a misunderstanding of the tension inherent in applying the
traditional propensity paradigm to the practice of battering. Domestic
violence "history" is probative of what happened on the occasion charged
because battering is characterized by patterns of behavior that are ongoing

190 See,

e.g., ALASKA R. REv. RULE 404(b)(4) (West 2003) (stating that in prosecution for

a crime involving domestic violence, evidence of other crimes involving domestic violence
by the defendant against the same or another person is admissible); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1109
(West 2003-04) (allowing generally evidence of defendant's "commission of other domestic
violence" in prosecution for offense involving domestic violence, subject to balancing of
probative value against prejudicial effect). Both statutes have survived constitutional
challenge. See Fuzzard v. State, 13 P.3d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000); People v. Jennings,
97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 734-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Johnson, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596,
598-601 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Brown, 92 Cal. Rtpr. 2d 433, 437-39 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000); People v. Hoover, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 212-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). Both of these
rules allow for the admission of acts of domestic violence against a victim other than the
person allegedly harmed in the case on trial. The battering statute I propose, which
criminalizes a course of conduct directed at the victim, would not alter the traditional 404(b)
analysis of acts of domestic violence against unrelated persons. See infra text of statute and
discussion at Part VIA.
'9' See CA. CALJIC No. 2.50.02 (2004); People v. Wu, 2003 WL 125019 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 16, 2003).
192 See CA. CALJIC No. 2.50.02.; Wu, 2003 WL 125019.
193 See infra note 295 and accompanying text (emphasizing that amending the rules of
evidence to require presumptive admission of prior acts in domestic violence case leaves
intact a regime which condones battering); infra Part V (discussing implications of failure to
condemn battering). From a criminal defense perspective, reform of the substantive criminal
law should be preferable to the enactment of evidentiary rules that arguably tend to lower the
prosecutor's burden of proof. See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
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and unseverable.194 Talk of a battering disposition or propensity to batter
would be meaningless if battering were defined accurately.' 9
In short, applying the evidentiary framework governing prior
misconduct to battering prosecutions is bound to result in incoherence
because domestic violence "history" is not in fact history; it is, rather, an
integral part of the batterer's continuing effort to control his victim.
Despite criminal law's insistence to the contrary, the pattern of domestic
violence cannot be vivisected. Doctrinal adjustments to the law governing
prior acts evidence reflect an imperfect effort to accommodate this reality.
B. EXPERT TESTIMONY ON BATTERING' 96
The prosecutorial use of experts to explain battering and its effects is
becoming increasingly common. 97 Expert testimony has been admitted to

A variation on this argument is advanced by Myrna Raeder. Raeder, supra note 150,
at 1491-92. Advocating for the admission of prior acts evidence in domestic femicide
prosecutions, Raeder asserts:
[]If character only prohibits general propensity, most domestic violence evidence is not banned
because it is situational-a repeated response in a specific relationship. The narrowness of the
conduct takes it out of general propensity reasoning which focuses on the defendant as a bad
person. Thus, the repetitive nature of the response is informative about the conduct on the
occasion in questions, thereby permitting domestic violence history to be introduced.
194

Id.
"9 Cf id. at 1499:
While the dynamics of control are undoubtedly rooted in the defendant's personality, the prior
acts of domestic violence do not depend on character for their relevance. Instead, they provide

the current motivation for the murder. The otherwise, unintelligible code imbedded in the
seemingly random acts of abuse can be deciphered by recognizing that when the defendant's
efforts fail to control the victim and he ends the relationship, the final act is murder because the
abuser fails to release control.

Id.
196

A substantial body of scholarship documents the development of this type of

testimony and explored its relationship to the doctrine of self-defense in the context of
women who kill their batterers in self-defense. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 12347; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 34-44; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing:
Women 's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 213 (1992). The growing use of expert testimony in prosecutions of
batterers has provoked less academic interest. But see Paula Finley Mangum, Note,
Reconceptualizing Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence: Prosecution Use of Expert
Testimony on Battering, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 593 (1999); Raeder, supra note 120, at
802-13; Joan M. Schroeder, Using Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Prosecution
ofa Batterer, 76 IOWA L. REV. 553 (1991).
197 Mangum, supra note 196, at 610. Mangum reports that as recently as the early 1990s,
courts paid little attention to the use of this type of testimony, and very few addressed its
admissibility. By 1999, twenty-seven states had admitted or discussed favorably the
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explain the victim's prior inconsistent statements or recantation at trial, and
to rehabilitate the victim's testimony once her credibility has been
attacked. 198 More broadly, jurors often find it difficult to fathom a victim's
actions during the course of the relationship, leading to the discrediting of
her account.1 99
An expert witness may elucidate seemingly
incomprehensible behaviors which are, in fact, quite typical and
understandable.2 00
Law receives its most holistic accounts of battering when experts are
permitted to testify to its effects. 2 ' The admission of expert testimony
concerning battered women's experiences 20 2 widens the legal lens, bringing
prosecutorial use of expert testimony on battering and its effects. For a description of the
evidentiary framework for admitting this type of testimony, see id. at 613.
198 Id.

'99 See supra Part

200

II.B.1.

Jurors "may expect victims and batterers to fit certain stereotypes and may have

certain expectations regarding a battered woman's behavior in a battering situation...
[e]xpert testimony identifying the dynamics of domestic violence and patterns of behavior in
battering relationships is relevant" and "particularly important for evaluating [the victim's]
credibility." Mangum, supra note 196, at 615. More broadly, Myrna Raeder asserts that
"jurors need background evidence about the dynamics of domestic violence in order to make
rational decisions about the significance of evidence presented at trial." Raeder, supra note
120, at 790. Raeder criticizes battered woman syndrome evidence as unnecessarily
"shoehoming" victims into a pathology that inaccurately describes the experiences of many
women. She urges the adoption of evidentiary policies that would allow juries to be
educated about the nature of battering without resort to syndrome evidence. Professor
Raeder's concerns would, I believe, be accommodated by the admission of expert testimony
on the effects of battering. See infra note 202. Raeder argues that "domestic violence
testimony imparts important background information in cases where abuse is significant in
explaining that a crime really happened, why it happened, or identifying who committed it."
Raeder, supra note 120, at 816.
2o) As Martha Mahoney observes, it is "[ironic that] the most complete description of
women's suffering from domestic violence has entered our case law and legal literature at
the point where violence against women finally harms men-when battered women kill in
self-defense." Mahoney, supra note 12, at 35.
202 Outside the courtroom, a consensus is developing that expert testimony on what has
been described as "battered woman syndrome" should be conceived more broadly as
testimony on battering and its effects, or as testimony concerning battered women's
experiences. This change is more than semantic. See NAT'L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN

CRIMINAL TRIALS (May 1996), availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94Guides/Trials;
Dutton, supra note 6. The DOJ/NIJ study cites earlier reports that conclude that "the term
'battered woman syndrome' is no longer useful or appropriate":
While recognizing its historical role in the introduction of expert testimony in this area, the
authors of these reports contend that the term does not reflect the breadth of empirical knowledge
now available concerning battering and its effects. Each notes that the phrase "battered woman
syndrome" implies that a single effect or set of effects characterizes the responses of all battered
women, a position unsupported by the research findings or clinical experience. They also raise
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context into view. By infusing criminal prosecutions with more complete
stories of battering, expert testimony challenges law's insistence that
context lacks meaning.0 3
Expert testimony on the effects of battering is relevant, of course, only
in cases where there is evidence of a battering relationship. 204 Nowadmissible testimony about the contours and dynamics of the relationship
forces jurors to grapple with the space between criminalized incidents of
physical violence. Challenging the structural imperative that charged
crimes be viewed in isolation, this testimony gives the lie to law's
suggestion that this space lacks meaning.
People v. Ellis, °5 a New York Court of Appeals decision, reveals how
true stories of battering can permeate transaction-based legal walls. In
Ellis, the prosecution sought to introduce expert testimony regarding what
was conceptualized as battered woman syndrome in order to help the jury
"understand the behavioral patterns of abused women and how the abuse
affects their conduct before, during and after the commission of a crime. 20 6
The defense objected on relevance grounds, arguing that the prosecution
had not laid a proper foundation for the introduction of the evidence.20 7 In

concerns that the word 'syndrome' may be misleading, by carrying connotations of pathology or
disease or that it may create a false perception that the battered woman "suffers from" a mental
defect. All preferred to refer to evidence or expert testimony "on battering and its effects" and
urged the adoption of this terminology as the standard phrase of reference.
NAT'L INST. OF JUST., supra.
203

Expert testimony was designed to overcome stereotypes about battered women by

providing the fact-finder with information regarding context. Perversely, battered woman
syndrome evidence has contributed to a focus on victimization and a view of the battered
woman as pathological. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 42.
204 This foundational requirement necessarily expands the permissible scope of factual
testimony at trial. As one court noted, addressing the admissibility of what was thendescribed as battered woman syndrome (BWS) testimony:
Of course, BWS expert testimony would only be admissible if it is relevant, based on a proper
evidentiary foundation .... "[T]he party seeking to introduce battered woman syndrome
evidence must lay an appropriate foundation substantiating that the conduct and behavior of the
witness isconsistent with the generally recognized symptoms of the battered woman syndrome,
and that the witness has behaved in such a manner that the jury would be aided by expert
testimony which provides apossible explanation for the behavior."
People v. Ellis, 650 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (quoting State v. Stringer, 897
P.2d 1063, 1070 (Mont. 1995)).
205 Id. at 503.
206 Id. at 506. The victim, who was married to the defendant throughout the battering,
recanted her allegations of abuse at trial and refused to testify after having testified before
the Grand Jury. The defendant was ultimately convicted of two counts of felony assault and
one count each of intimidating a witness and menacing.
207 The defense argument as summarized by the court is as follows:
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ruling that the expert would be permitted to testify, the trial court found that
the prosecution had presented evidence sufficient to provide a foundation
for the expert's testimony.
According to the trial court opinion, evidence relevant to the
foundation issue included the following: "discipline and physical abuse in
the past"; the defendant's criticism of the victim's housekeeping; the
victim's failure to shield herself from blows by keeping her hands in her lap
while being beaten; the defendant's efforts to "get the complainant to return
to him"; and the victim's self-blaming for causing the incidents.2 8 In short,
the relationship as a whole was deemed relevant to the question of whether
the victim's conduct might be better understood with help from an expert
on the dynamics of battering. 209
The use of this type of expert testimony to prosecute perpetrators of
domestic violence may be aptly characterized both as significant and as
limited. Predicated on a recognition that the battering relationship itself
may give meaning to otherwise unfathomable acts and omissions, expert
testimony on battering represents a partial neutralization of law's atomizing
force. At the same time, the admission of expert testimony is bounded by
formal evidentiary rules 2t and, even more tightly, by the trial court's notion
of relevance.
Conceptions of the relevance of expert testimony to domestic violence
prosecutions differ dramatically.
For instance, Myrna Raeder has
suggested: "Jurors need background evidence about the dynamics of
domestic violence in order to make rational decisions about the significance
of evidence presented at trial."22 '

[T]he People have not laid a proper foundation for the introduction of this evidence because the
complainant has never been determined to be a battered woman by an expert nor is there
evidence before the jury that she suffers from this condition. Further, the defendant argues that
the complainant's recantation is self-explanatory and that the jury was given the reason for the
recantztion by the complainant, when she described her initial accusation as false and based on
the vengeance for her husband's infidelity.

Id. at 507-08.
208 Id.

at 508.

Note the court's focus on the victim's conduct and credibility. While admission of
expert testimony on battering properly contextualizes domestic violence (at least in part), it
should be emphasized that the concomitant fixation on the victim's behavior is highly
209

problematic. See Mahoney, supra note 12; Schneider, supra note 68.

210 See supra note 197 (citing Mangum's discussion of applicable evidentiary
framework).

211Raeder, supra note 120, at 790.
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Contrast this understanding of the importance of contextualizing
battering to the function of expert testimony articulated by the Michigan
Supreme Court in People v. Christel:
In this case, the expert testimony was arguably relevant and helpful in understanding
complainant's actions in tolerating physical abuse over a period of years. Moreover,
it may have been relevant in explaining why complainant did not report similar
incidents earlier. On the other hand, its relevance did not reach the level found in
other battered women cases that have considered this issue. Complainant did not
remain in the relationship until the date of the assault and try to hide or deny the
abuse, did not delay reporting this incident, and did not later retract the claim of
abuse. Instead, complainant testified that the relationship ended one month before the
assault, explained that she immediately reported the sexual assault, and has
consistently maintained that the abuse occurred. Although the testimony was
arguably relevant and helpful, on these facts, we are persuaded that a more direct
connection and factual premise is necessary, and, hence, we deem the trial court's
decision to admit the testimony to be error.

The court's conclusion that the trial judge erred in allowing expert
testimony.. 3 follows from its judgment that the complaining witness did not
act in a manner requiring explanation. 1 4 From the opinion we learn these
25
facts about the relationship between the complainant and the defendant: ,
For several years before this incident, defendant and complainant shared an on-again,
off-again romantic relationship. . . . [In December 1989] heated arguments and
physical abuse compelled complainant to ask defendant to move out. Complainant
testified that this ended their relationship, whereas defendant claimed
that the
216
relationship continued nonetheless until the date of this alleged assault.
At trial, complainant testified that their relationship began well, but later progressed
into both verbal and physical abuse. Defendant apparently became extremely jealous
of complainant; he accused her of dating other men and became angered at any
intimation that she was looking at other men in person, on television, or in pictures.

212

People v. Christel, 537 N.W.2d 194, 196-97 (Mich. 1995).
court found "the error harmless in light of the limited nature of the [expert]

213 The

testimony and the other physical and testimonial evidence of abuse." Id. at 197.
214 Id.; see also State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1115 n.15 (Conn. 1993) (stating that
"expert testimony on the subject of battered woman's syndrome is not relevant unless there
is some evidentiary foundation that a party or witness to the case is a battered woman, and
that party or witness has behaved in such a manner that the jury would be aided by expert
testimony providing an explanation for the behavior") (citation omitted).
215 Evidence of the uncharged acts of abuse was admitted at trial pursuant to a 404(b)
motion. The trial court allowed the evidence in order to "place the charged activity in
context so that the jury could better appreciate the competing claims of force and consent."
Christel, 537 N.W.2d at 199 n.12 (quoting People v. Christel, No. 140721, slip op. at I
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1993)). Christel was not held criminally responsible for any of these
incidents. Id. at 204.
216 Id. at 197; see infra text accompanying notes 238-40.
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This jealousy often turned to rage and beatings, followed by compelled sexual
2 17
intercourse. Complainant described this behavior as being a "game" for defendant.

The defendant was charged with breaking into complainant's apartment and
raping her on January 23, 1990.218 At trial, "complainant was portrayed as
a liar, a perjurer, [and] a self-mutilator. 21 9
The Christel court generally recognizes the admissibility of expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome but qualifies its holding,
emphasizing "that the admissibility of syndrome evidence is limited to a
description of the uniqueness of a specific behavior brought out at trial."220
Here this requisite "uniqueness of a specific behavior" was apparently
missing. The court's rationale for its finding of error is labyrinthine:
In the instant case, while there may have been some basis for the testimony, we find
the necessary factual underpinnings for admission of expert testimony lacking.
Certainly there may have been a question why complainant tolerated prolonged abuse
without reporting it to authorities or friends. However, defendant never denied that
some [of the prior] abuse occurred. Furthermore, complainant testified that the
relationship ended one month before the [charged] assault and did not attempt to hide
or deny the instant sexual assault. Moreover, complainant did not relay reporting this
incident, but, instead, immediately sought medical attention with accompanying
discussions with police.... Complainant also never recanted that the assault occurred.
• . . [W]e reject the prosecution's
contention that the battered woman syndrome was
2
relevant in this case.

Despite its references to seemingly "objective" or universal notions of
relevance, the law as applied reflects a particular perspective on
foundational facts. If expert testimony on battering is deemed relevant only
when the victim behaves in a proscribed manner, domestic violence out of
context remains the legal rule.
Expert testimony and its potential to push
outward on law's narrowly circumscribed boundary of relevance is thus
constricted.

217

Christel, 537 N.W.2d at 197.

218 At the time, complainant was six months pregnant and suffered premature labor
contractions as a result of the rape. She was bruised, scratched, bloodied and swollen
vaginally when she arrived at the hospital to be treated for the contractions. Hospital
personnel (as opposed to the complainant) notified the police. Id. at 197-98. Although it is
not uncommon in domestic violence cases for the victim not to report an incident to the
police, or to do so after some delay, a complaining witness's "failure to report" often raises
credibility issues for the trier of fact.
219 Id. at 198; Christel was convicted of the sexual assault and acquitted of breaking and
entering. Id. at 197.
220 Id. at 201 (quoting People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 406 (Mich. 1990)).
221 Id. at 204.
222This is true regardless of the definition of how the victim must behave to warrant the
introduction of expert testimony. See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 212.
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Nonetheless, that certain circumstances trigger law's acceptance of a
fuller account of battering challenges the system's default to the contrary.
C. PROSECUTING STALKING
Anti-stalking legislation 211 criminalizes a continuing course of
conduct,22 4 codifying a recognition that seemingly isolated events must be
viewed in context in order for their meaning to be discerned. Defining a
pattern of behavior as criminal, the law accounts for the reality of stalking.225
Application of laws against stalking to the domestic violence context
reveals the profound importance of framing crime as other than

223

For a comprehensive report on federal, state, and model anti-stalking legislation

(including sentencing provisions), see
OF

JUST.,

STALKING

AND

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN GRANTS OFF., U.S. DEP'T
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
1 (1998),
available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/grants/stalk98/; see also Jennifer L. Bradfield, Note, AntiStalking Laws: Do they Adequately Protect Stalking Victims?, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229
(1998) (critiquing the effectiveness of the anti-stalking laws); Laurie Salame, Note, A
National Survey of Stalking Laws: A Legislative Trend Comes to the Aid of Domestic
Violence Victims and Others, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 67 (1993) (discussing the development
of anti-stalking legislation and constitutional issues it potentially raises).
224 See Salame, supra note 223, at 73-74. "A representative definition of 'course of
conduct' [contained in stalking laws] is a "pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose." Id.
225 Though well-publicized celebrity stalking cases were often the impetus for passage of
anti-stalking laws, the tight connection between domestic violence and stalking has been
recognized by lawmakers. See, e.g., Michael V. Saxl, The Struggle to Make Stalking a
Crime: A Legislative Road Map of How to Develop Effective Stalking Legislation in Maine,
23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 57 (1998). Sax], then House Majority Whip of the Maine House of
Representatives, proposed the anti-stalking legislation that ultimately became law in Maine.
Saxl explains the importance of this law for battered women:
Although Maine is among the most crime-free states in the nation, domestic violence represents
the largest percentage of all felonies committed in Maine. Domestic abuse professionals in
Maine have identified stalking as a critical component of domestic violence in Maine. Indeed,
stalking occurs in eighty percent of domestic violence cases in Maine.
Id. at 62 (citations omitted). Further evincing an awareness that domestic violence and
stalking are linked is the congressional requirement, codified as part of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), that the Attorney General submit an annual report providing
"information concerning the incidence of stalking and domestic violence, and evaluating the
effectiveness of antistalking efforts and legislation." STALKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
supra note 223.
Feminist scholars and advocates for battered women have also explored the nexus
between stalking and battering. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 65 ("The broader
description of battering relationships is premised on an understanding of coercive behavior
and of power and control-including a continuum of sexual and verbal abuse, threats,
economic coercion, stalking, and social isolation-rather than 'number of hits."') (citation
omitted).
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transactional in nature.2 26 Inquiry into how anti-stalking laws have been
used to prosecute batterers encompasses consideration of the ways in which
these laws have generally not been used.227 This, in turn, says a good deal
about how socially drawn lines become legally significant.228 We are
ultimately interested in what this story reveals about the criminal law's
response to battering.
Stalking behavior as it tends to be understood in the domestic violence
context is normally triggered by some type of separation-or an expressed
desire to separate-on the part of the victim. 229 Mahoney calls
this
"separation assault" and notes that "it often takes place over time":230
Separation assault is the attack on the woman's body and volition in which her partner
seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force her to return. It
aims at overbearing her will as to where and with whom she will live, and coercing
her in order to enforce connection in a relationship. It is an attempt to gain, retain,
2 3 or
regain power in a relationship, or to punish the woman for ending the relationship. 1

The concept of separation assault is closely, though not perfectly, aligned
with social understandings of stalking. The nexus between domestic
violence and stalking-tight 232 and often lethal 233-makes stalking statutes
226

See infra Part V (discussing implications of law's failure to account for women's

experiences); cf Mahoney, supra note 12, at 60 (offering that "[t]o bring women's
experience into law and make it more comprehensible to women ourselves, we need
litigation strategies aimed at exposing the power and control at the heart of battering").
227 See infra text accompanying notes 229-40.
228 See infra text accompanying notes 236-37.
229 See Salame, supra note 223, at 85 ("Unwilling to relinquish control of their former
lovers, batterers become stalkers, pursuing their victims after the victims leave the abusive
relationship."). The term "post-separation woman abuse" explicitly focuses on separation as
a critical conceptual moment. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 64-65 (critiquing the term for
its failure to capture the cases where violence occurs in response to the expressed decision to
separate, as opposed to actual separation). Mahoney's articulation of separation assault
"recast[s] the entire discussion of separation in terms of the batterer's violent attempts at
control." Id. at 64.
230 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 65-66.
231

Id.

232 See id. at 64 (stating that "at least half of women who leave their abusers are followed

and harassed or further attacked by them");

STALKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note
223, at 14 (citing National Violence Against Women Survey finding that eighty-one percent
of women stalked by a current or former intimate partner were also physically assaulted by
the same partner); Saxl, supra note 225, at 62 (stating that "stalking occurs in eighty percent
of domestic violence cases in Maine") (footnote omitted); Salame, supra note 223, at 83
(stating that "[i]t is difficult to separate stalking from domestic violence").
233 See Salame, supra note 223, at 86. "The most dangerous time for victims of domestic
violence occurs when victims leave or attempt to leave the abusive relationship. In many
cases, the batterer-turned-stalkerultimately finds and murders the victim." Id. (emphasis
added). Stalking is one factor on the list of "lethality indicators" that suggest a batterer is
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an important component of law enforcement efforts to protect victims and
hold batterers responsible for their behaviors. 3
But when does the "batterer" turn "stalker"? 235 We will see that the
clear applicability of stalking laws to the paradigmatic fact pattern-abuser
"unable to relinquish control' ' 236 pursues victim attempting to extricate
herself from the relationship-results in the reification of what comes to be
known as stalking's onset. That is, defining separation as the necessary
condition for stalking imbues separation with unwarranted meaning.2 37
The practice of battering is not transformed by "separation. 238 Rather,
the desire to exert power and control continues to dominate the
relationship.23 9 In a bizarre twist, what the law validates in the stalking
context-that isolated incidents must be understood as pieces of a pattern of
control-it denies in the pre-separation domestic violence context. The

particularly likely to kill his victim. See Janet A. Johnson et al., Death by Intimacy: Risk
Factorsfor Domestic Violence, 20 PACE L. REv. 263,283 (2000).
234 We do not know how often batterers are charged with, and convicted of, stalking.

The National Violence Against Women Survey, cited in

STALKING

AND

DOMESTIC

supra note 223, at 18, does not disaggregate intimate stalking cases from
acquaintance/stranger stalking cases in its discussion of the frequency of stalking
prosecutions. I am aware of no systematic study of stalking prosecutions in a domestic
violence context, though such prosecutions are well represented in the appellate case law.
.See, e.g., Bowell v. State, No. A-6293, 1999 Alas. App. LEXIS 110 (Oct. 6, 1999);
Commonwealth v. Davis, 737 A. 2d 792 (Pa. 1999); State v. Rapey, No. 97-0279-CR, 1998
WL 86283 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1998). Unsurprisingly, each of these defendants engaged
in an on-going course of abusive conduct that preceded the behavior characterized (and
charged) as stalking.
235 Salame, supra note 223, at 86.
VIOLENCE,

236

Id. at 85.

237

Even were this definition correct as a conceptual matter, separation resists

identification as a moment in time. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 65:
When the decision, rather than actual separation, triggers the attack, the circumstances of the
violence may not reveal the assault on separation: the couples may still have been living
together, and the attack may have taken place inside their mutual home-yet the attack may have

been a direct response to her assertion of the will to separate or her first physical moves toward
separation.

Id.
238

I mean to suggest that in the domestic violence context, what we call battering and

what we call stalking are of a piece. Mahoney makes a similar point when she asserts that
defining separation assault is one way to "expose the struggle for control" in women's
experience of battering. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 65. Separation assault lies on the
"continuum of control" and helps to "illuminate the issue of violence as part of the issue of
power." Id. at 5, 69.
239 There surely is a relationship between a "stalking" batterer and his victim.
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batterer's quest for power
is considered only when the "relationship" is
240
deemed to be "over.,
This rather simplistic doctrinal regime superimposes itself on realities
far more complex. For instance, the case of State v. Whitesel 24' reveals this
dissonance. The opinion begins:
The relevant facts of this case span over an 8-year period. Julie met Whitesell in 1989,
became pregnant, and married him in 1990. Whitesell and Julie rarely lived together
as the relationship was abusive from the start. When Julie and Whitesell did live
often flee with her children to her sister's house when Whitesell
together, Julie would
242
became violent.

Already we see the conceptual impossibility of identifying a moment of

separation. Indeed the court's recitation of facts includes various physical
departures and returns on the part of both Julie and Jon.243
Over the course of their marriage, the following incidents took
place. 244 Jon threw Julie into a closet and refused to let her out. 245 He laid
out all their knives in a pattern on the kitchen table. 24 He pulled Julie from
the driver's seat and began driving dangerously fast until Julie managed to
jump out of the car and run away at a stop light.247 He threatened her,
telling her that she hadn't "seen anything yet" and that he "could come and
find her if he needed to. '248 He threw water on her while she was sleeping
and told her that he was taking their daughter. When Julie tried to stop Jon
from driving away, he pounded her head against the steering wheel, shoved
her to the ground, and pulled her hair out. 249 He disabled the air conditioner
and removed parts from Julie's car.25 °
After Julie obtained a protective order, Jon tried breaking into her
home. 25' He told Julie that marriage was "till death do us part. 252 He
240

Accordingly, in many abusive relationships there is no apparent separation sufficient

to trigger application of this stalking paradigm.
241 13 P.3d 887 (Kan. 2000).
242 Id. at 896.
243 For instance, Jon moved back into the house with Julie when she was diagnosed with
cancer. Id.
244 Note the transaction-based nature of this narrative, gleaned, as it is, from the appellate
summary of facts. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
245 Whitesell, 13 P.3d at 896.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248

Id.

249

See infra note 270 (indicating that Whitesell was convicted of battery based on this

incident).
250 Whitesell, 13 P.3d at 896.
251Id.
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pushed her, locked her in the bathroom with him, threw her into the comer
and "pressed his pelvis into her," like he was going to rape her. He instead
threw her in the hall with such force that her foot went through the wall.253
Once he threw a television set.254 When Julie tried to leave the home,
Jon slapped and kicked her, forcing her to escape to the bathroom with the
children. He kicked in the door to the bathroom.2 55 He went to Julie's
boe257into the garage.
He
father's house screaming for his gun.256 He broke
called the district attorney and said that he had a gun and would kill Julie.258
He followed her, drove by her house, and sent her a note referencing the
O.J. Simpson trial (which was taking place at the time). 25 9 He left suicide
of her locked car and sent a birthday card that read, "I will not
notes inside
, ,260
quit.
Julie filed for divorce 261 and obtained a protective order. Jon drove by
her house by car and by bicycle, over and over again.262 He parked nearby
with his lights off and binoculars in the car.263 Once he drove by while
Julie's new boyfriend was mowing the lawn, called her a slut and told her to
"watch her back. 2 64 He watched the house from a field near the yard.265
He sent her a copy of the Kansas adultery statute and a bible with a
e
-266
He followed
handwritten inscription saying that he would not quit.
26 7
Julie's boyfriend to work and confronted him about "screwing his wife.
Jon was subsequently arrested and charged with stalking. 68
252

Id.

253

id.
id.

254
255
256
257

258
259
260
261

Id.
id.
Id. at 897.

Id.
Id.
Id.
This was the second time Julie filed for divorce. The first time she dismissed the

divorce action after discovering that she was pregnant with Jon's baby.
262 Whitesell, 13 P.3d at 897-98.
263

Id. at 898.

264

Id.
id.
Id.
Id.
Jon was convicted of stalking. See infra note 289 (summarizing Kansas stalking

265
266
267
268

statute). After judgment was vacated on jurisdictional grounds, he was again convicted and
sentenced to five years of probation. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
denying the defendant's constitutional challenge to the stalking statute, but vacated sentence
because the trial judge had failed to make a record justifying the upward departure from the
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The story of the relationship between Jon and Julie raises this question:
when does the battering end and the stalking begin? We would expect that
the law would locate the moment of "separation"--here, the filing of the
second, final divorce action 269-and define as stalking all conduct that
followed it. And indeed Julie's second "decision to seek a divorce"
triggered the invocation of criminal law.2 70 The battering that she endured
up until this point was in no way redressed.27 1
The story of Patricia Brady, also a victim of domestic violence,
illustrates many of these same contradictions. 272 Ronald Ledesma, a San
Jose police officer,273 became intimately involved with Patricia in the early
1980's, and the two moved in together in 1991. Their relationship was
"always tumultuous and beset with instances of domestic violence, 27 4 and
Patricia was repeatedly assaulted and raped over the years. 275
presumptive two-year probationary sentence. This issue was mooted by a procedural motion
made in the interim by the State. The motion did not change the duration of probation but
limited its appealability. State v. Whitesell, 33 P.3d 865 (Kan. 2001).
269 Finality is defined here in relation to the criminal prosecution-that is, Jon was
arrested and charged with stalking while this second divorce action was still pending.
270 With one exception, Jon Whitesell's battering-seven years
of it-was wholly
untouched by the criminal law until the legally anointed moment of separation. The
exception is that Jon was apparently convicted of one count of domestic battery years earlier
for an attack that required the intervention of "several firemen who had responded to a
nearby emergency." Whitesell, 13 P.3d at 896.
271 We know very little about the "pre-separation" relationship between Jon and Julie.
What we do know results from the trial court's discretionary ruling to allow the prosecutor to
present this evidence. See supra notes 155-66 and accompanying text (discussing
importance of FED. R. EVID. 404(b) litigation in domestic violence cases). The Kansas
Supreme Court affirmed the use of this evidence to prove Jon's intent to stalk Julie and his
motive for doing so. The court also noted its relevance to the issue of Julie's fear of Jon
during the four-month period in which he stalked her. It is fair to say that what Jon did to
Julie before the two were deemed to have separated is legally significant only to the extent
that it bears on what came after. See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
272 People v. Ledesma, No. H021604, 2002 LEXIS 360 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2002).
The facts revealed by an appellate decision are wholly circumscribed by the legal stiuctures
that we have been discussing. That the pattern of power and control can barely be glimpsed
through the recited "facts" proves the limits of law, not the absence of context. See supra
text accompanying note 13 (commenting on the meaning of the space between transactional
incidents).
273 We can assume that Ronald had ready access to guns and that Patricia
was well aware
of this fact.
274 Ledesna, 2002 LEXIS 360, at *2. We learn nothing specific about the violence that
was perpetrated during this period of time.
275 We know this because the prosecutor moved to admit these acts of "uncharged
domestic violence" under California's applicable evidentiary statute. Unlike the rule in most
jurisdictions, California's code makes prior acts of domestic violence presumptively relevant
and admissible subject to a balancing of its probative value against the risk of undue
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On September 14, 1997, Ronald attacked Patricia as they were leaving
a football game. While the car was moving, he grabbed her hair and pulled
her down on him. As she was screaming in pain, Ronald began pulling on
her ear, eventually tearing it from her scalp.
The court explains:
By the summer of 1998, Brady was trying to end her relationship with defendant, but
he refused to accept that it might be over. He warned Brady that if she ever got
together with another man, he would kill her. "No other man is ever going to have
you," he exhorted. Notwithstanding these warnings, Brady told defendant on
September 14 that she was breakin off the relationship. Defendant again refused to
concede the relationship was over.

According to the opinion, "their relationship lasted until September 14,
1998, when Patricia told defendant she did not want to see him
anymore. ' 277 From this date until February 1999, Ronald "repeatedly sent
Brady notes and flowers, he drove by her house, and he called her five or
six times a day at work, and another five or six times a day at home,
sometimes late at night, which interrupted her sleep. 278 At one point,
Patricia changed her locks and home phone number, but Ronald continued
to call her at work. He told her, "we're getting back together we are going
to see each other, period. 279
On February 21, 1999, Ronald came to Patricia's condominium at
around 11:00 p.m. After seeing him in the parking lot, she heard his
footsteps coming up the stairs, and knew he was trying to come inside when
the knob turned. The deadbolt kept him out. When the police responded to
Patricia's 911 call, Ronald was gone. 280 Patricia and her daughter left the
condominium for the night. Around 3:30, Ronald was found on Patricia's
balcony by the security guard, who called the police. Ronald had entered
by removing the sliding door from its tracks, thrown Patricia's clothes
around the bedroom, and left a note on her front door. 28 Ronald was
prejudice. See supra note 190. It is interesting to note that three of the acts in question were
in all likelihood recalled with the necessary specificity because they occurred on holidaysEaster, Good Friday and Christmas-although Patricia was confused about the year that
some of these attacks took place. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing
difficulty presented by pleading requirements).
276 Ledesma, 2002 LEXIS 360 at **5-6.
277 Id. at *5.
271 Id. at *6.
279 Id. at *7.
280 Patricia was understandably "reluctant" to tell police Ronald's name. When she did,
police advised her to leave the condominium with her daughter for the night. Id.
281 The note read: "Pat, I guess Ernie was right; Sunday night and you're with your new
boyfriend; here's two a.m. you're not home; P.S. a little gift, Ron .. .I hope you're not
'shacked up."' Id. at *9.
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arrested after telling police that Patricia had invited him over and that she
was "probably out with some new boyfriend."
Ronald was charged with one count of stalking.282 Given the
significance of separation, we might wonder when (in the eye of law)
Ronald began stalking Patricia. At what point in time does the course of
conduct begin? And does the law take account of, or does it deny, the full
spectrum of violence and control in the relationship before the defined
moment of separation?
As anticipated, law disregards the continuing course of conduct that
dominated Patricia's life before the relationship is deemed to have "ended."
The stalking "began" on September 14, 1998, when Patricia "told [Ronald]
that she was breaking off the relationship.2 83 The criminal conduct
included the notes, flowers, letters, phone calls, drive-bys, and break-in.
This the jury came to understand as a pattern of behavior intricately bound
up in Ronald's desire to control Patricia.28 4 Each note was considered in
context; no act was isolated from the others.
Compare this to law's treatment of all that came before. Ronald was
held accountable for one assault, and no others. He was not charged with
raping Patricia or with threatening to kill her. The other (physical) acts of
domestic violence that the prosecutor was permitted to introduce-those
that Patricia was able to attach dates to--were admitted solely to prove the
crimes that were, in fact, charged. 28 5 To the extent that "opinion evidence"
about the nature of the relationship was allowed, it was admitted for its
relevance to the stalking charge.286 All that comes before September 14,

282

Ronald Ledesma was also convicted of one count of assault for the incident of

September 15, 1997. Id. at *3.
283Id. at *5. Ledesma was convicted of stalking for conduct occurring from September
14, 1998, through February 22, 1999. This was confirmed by a prosecutor in the Santa Clara
County District Attorney's office. Telephone Interview with Rolanda Pierre-Dixon,
Assistant District Attorney, Santa Clara District Attorney's Office (Dec. 19, 2003).
284 Viewing the (post-separation) relationship in context, the appellate court characterizes
the defendant's stalking behavior as "months and months of harassment, leaving Brady
physically and emotionally exhausted and fearful for her life." Id. at *19.
285 Again, California is unusual in allowing prior acts of domestic violence to be
admitted to prove a "disposition" to commit domestic violence. See supra note 190 and
accompanying text.
286 The trial court allowed:
testimony by Patricia's daughter that defendant was
"dominating, controlling, and manipulative" and that Patricia would become "quiet" when
Ronald "shouted to her to 'shut up'; testimony by a friend that Patricia became "quiet,
guarded with what she'd say-I would call it shy" around Ledesma; and testimony by
Patricia's employer that she viewed Ronald as "controlling" of Patricia's activities.
Ledesma, 2002 LEXIS 360, at *23. On appeal the defendant argued that this testimony
constituted inadmissible opinion evidence. The appellate court affirmed its admission,
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when Patricia "separates" from Ronald, is significant only insofar as it
bears on the single incident of assault charged and the stalking that begins
where the relationship apparently ends.
Under California's anti-stalking law it is a crime to willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follow or harass another person and to make a
"credible threat" with the intent to place the victim in reasonable fear of his
or her safety. 87 The statute seemingly makes Ronald guilty of stalking
from the time he began battering Patricia. The legislative definition of
stalking is certainly not the most apt description of battering.288 But as
applied to battering relationships, the statute fails to distinguish between
pre- and post-separation conduct. 289 Anti-stalking legislation could, then,

noting that opinions are admissible where they are "less a matter of judgment and more a
matter of observation." Id. at **23-24.
287 In pertinent part the law reads as follows:
(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously
harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family is guilty of the
crime of stalking ....
(e) For the purposes of this section, "harasses" means engages in a knowing and willful course
of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes the
person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.
(f) For the purposes of this section, "course of conduct" means two or more acts occurring over
a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected
activity is not included within the meaning of "course of conduct."
(g) For the purposes of this section, "credible threat" means a verbal or written threat, including
that performed through the use of an electronic communication device, or a threat implied by a
pattern of conduct or a combination of verbal, written, or electronically communicated
statements and conduct, made with the intent to place the person that is the target of the threat in
reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family, and made with the apparent
ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to
reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family. It is not necessary to prove
that the defendant had the intent to actually carry out the threat. The present incarceration of a
person making the threat shall not be a bar to prosecution under this section. Constitutionally
protected activity is not included within the meaning of "credible threat."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2003).
288 There are fundamental differences in the meaning of stalking behavior when a
batterer is the perpetrator (in contrast to when he is a stranger or an acquaintance). While

anti-stalking laws may be broad enough on their face to apply to battering, there is
necessarily a contortion that results when a law is applied to remedy uncontemplated harms.

Most notably, legal conceptions of stalking are not defined by the perpetrator's continuing
struggle for power. Contrast stalking laws to the proposed domestic violence statute at infra
Part VI.A.
289The same can be said of the statute used to prosecute Jon Whitesell. It reads in
pertinent part as follows:
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be used to prosecute a course of conduct that comprises the entirety of the
battering relationship.2 90
This application of stalking statutes was not designed by legislatures or
courts.291 It does not comport with social understandings of stalking, 292 nor
does it truly capture the harm of battering. 293 But the statutory definition of
stalking may allow for a fuller account of battering than does any other
criminal statute currently on the books.
Criminalization of a course of conduct demands a contextualized view
of acts understood to be of a piece. In particular, anti-stalking legislation
embodies a legal recognition of crime that is neither coterminous with a
discrete incident nor the sum of isolated constituent parts. In this manner
statutes defining the crime of stalking partly bridge the distance between
life and law's construction of it.
D. LIMITATIONS OF LAW'S MEDIATIONS
Even where law has failed to account for a widely shared experiential
reality it does not remain untouched by it. Instead, legal structures adjust in

(a) Stalking is an intentional, malicious and repeated following or harassment of another person
and making a credible threat with the intent to place such person in reasonable fear for such
person's safety ....
(d) For the purposes of this section: (1) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct
composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of
purpose and which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and
must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the person. Constitutionally protected
activity is not included within the meaning of"course of conduct."
(2) "Harassment" means a knowing and intentional course of conduct directed at a specific
person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments or terrorizes the person, and that serves no
legitimate purpose.
(3) "Credible threat" means a verbal or written threat, including that which is communicated via
electronic means, or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of verbal or
written statements and conduct made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the
threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for such person's
safety.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3438 (2002).
290 1have found no indication that

this prosecutorial practice is widespread. New York

County is one jurisdiction applying stalking laws in this manner. Telephone Interview with
Laurence E. Busching, Bureau Chief, Family Violence and Child Abuse Bureau, New York
County District Attorney's Office (Dec. 17, 2003).
29, See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
292See supra text accompanying notes 229-32.
293 To the extent that the statute's technical fit conflicts with social understandings,
judges and juries may be unreceptive to prosecutions that stretch the perceived limits of what
constitutes stalking. See supra Part IV.D (noting absence of control in stalking definition).
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response to incompatible stories of suffering. Yet as long as criminal law
paradigms live safely, these narratives are inevitably perverted, the injuries
they describe unremedied. While law may appear to expand, its movement
is constrained by unchallenged premises.
So there is play at the margins. For its bearing on the particular
incident charged, domestic violence history may be admitted-but it may
not be,294 and its probative value either way is doctrinally limited: even if
prior acts are admitted pursuant to 404(b) or a reformed state analogue, the
conduct that is "prior" remains condoned by law. 295 Experts on battering
may be permitted to testify and effectively "open the door" to evidence of
relationship context-but admissibility is contingent on the testimony
conforming to a victim-focused template. Stalking laws grant legal status
to the continuing course of conduct and tacitly acknowledge the
significance of relationship---but separation is arbitrarily designated by
sociolegal culture as the moment at which context comes to matter, and
statutory language fails to describe the centrality of control to the criminal
enterprise.
In short, this play at the margins has left intact law's fatal
misunderstanding of domestic violence, preordaining criminal justice
system failure. Under the current regime, battering conduct is situated on
the legal side of the law; tinkering fails to engage this reality. Until
domestic violence is truly criminalized, doctrinal and legislative reforms
will fall short.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREACH

Law's failure to criminalize the true nature of battering is an injustice
that begets a multitude of wrongs. We now turn to the implications of law's
failure to define, and thus condemn, battering. What consequences flow
from the legal rupture of experience?296

See supra note 179 (noting wide judicial discretion in this realm).
It bears emphasizing that amending the rules of evidence to require presumptive
admission of prior acts in domestic violence cases fails to engage the substantive criminal
law, leaving in place a regime which condones battering as it is practiced. See infra Part V.
296 For the sake of the remaining discussion, let us assume that our current system
could-with reform at the margins-function in domestic violence cases to convict
defendants who are guilty of the crimes charged. Accepting this supposition focuses our
inquiry on the inadequacies of existing statutes under which batterers may be prosecuted and
convicted.
294
295
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A. PUNISHMENT
Law's denial of the full panoply of injuries inflicted on and suffered by
battered women necessarily results in systemic malfunctioning. The
legitimacy of our criminal justice system rests on the proposition that
punishment on behalf of the state can be justified. To the extent that
criminal sanctions are imposed, we should reasonably expect that some
articulable function is served.297 Whether this function is retributive or
utilitarian in nature-or a dynamic, mutating amalgamation 298-it
is
presumably advanced only to the extent that the system has correctly
identified the societal harm resulting from the criminal conduct. 299
This observation does not rest on any particular punishment theory,
nor does it require that we grapple with the deep philosophical questions
inevitably raised by the very existence of criminal laws. Rather, I start from
the premise that the imposition of punishment can be justified and assume
logically that the functioning of the system is contingent on its proper
recognition of harm. If this is true, the failure of criminal law to capture the
experience of battering severely undermines its legitimacy in this realm.
In the domestic violence context, the severity of available criminal law
sanctions does not reflect the scope of the harm perpetrated. 3°° In this
respect, law's inability to define battering wholly subverts the ideal of
proportionality. 30 1 Battering conduct obscured by criminal law paradigms
goes unpunished. This means that moral blame is not ascribed,30 2 future
297 A vast literature attempts to justify the imposition of criminal punishment. See, e.g.,

4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1136, 1340-41 (Sanford H.
Kadish, ed. 1983) (entry for "punishment"); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
(1968); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL
(1973); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453
(1997).
298 "The idea that a single normative theory does or should determine the shape of all
criminal doctrines is exceedingly implausible." Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two
Conceptions of Emotions in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. Rev. 269, 350 (1996).
299 Criminal law is directed at conduct only to the extent that it causes harm. See
KENT GREENAWALT,

LAFAVE, supra note 71, § 3.1. Put differently, "[a]cts of harming ...
of the criminal law." JOEL FEINBERG, HARM To OTHERS 31 (1994).
300 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.

are the direct objects

301 See generally HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW SANCTION 139-

45 (1968).
302 See Paul H. Robinson, PunishingDangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1429, 1443 (2001):
[Mioral authority gives the criminal law persuasive power to label as morally condemnable
conduct that was not previously seen as such. That is, a criminal law with moral credibility can
facilitate the internalization of norms that counsel against prohibited conduct. It is this
internalization of norms by individuals and their family and acquaintances that has the greatest
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battering is not deterred,3 3 and we cannot even hope for rehabilitation. 3 4
In short, battering lives-as do batterers and their victims-outside the
reaches of criminal law.
B. VICTIMS
Battered women experience law's failure on the individual level and as
members of a collective. When battering behavior goes unpunished victims
rightly perceive that whatever promise of justice the system offers has been
broken.30 5 Batterers are not meaningfully condemned,30 6 the full spectrum
of control is not deterred,30 7 and victims are uniquely situated to suffer for
these failings.
A prosecutor who has handled domestic violence cases has in all
likelihood heard: but this (the crime formally charged) is not the worst that
he did to me, usually followed by a painful story of what is. She calls for
understanding at the very least and, beyond, for remediation, a fuller
measure of justice. The prosecutor explains: only this is what the law says
is criminal, only this can be spoken of in court, only for this may he be held
accountable, and so on.
A battered woman, upon confronting legal structures impermeable to
her stories, learns that the criminal law does not go to the places of her
suffering. This knowledge is constructive, shaping her understanding of

effect in controlling conduct. Finally, a criminal law with moral authority can influence conduct
by helping to shape community norms.

Id.
303 See

id.

304 It is helpful to assume momentarily the perspective of the batterer charged under the

existing criminal law framework. Presumably he assesses the wrongfulness of his conduct,
at least in part, in relation to the formal charges that are brought against him. (If not, we
should be skeptical of the promise of deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation.) This
batterer will learn very little about the wrong of battering from the legal system's formal
charge and the proof it allows. Unless we are willing to exempt the criminal defendant from
law's prescriptive power, this is unacceptable.
305 The posited existence of a belief in the promise of justice may reflect an unduly
optimistic vision of the relationship between battered women and the law. The alternative is
suggested by Catharine MacKinnon, who writes:
[mlostly women feel that the law is not about them, has no idea who they are or what they face
or how they think or feel, has nothing to say to them and can do nothing for them. When the law
and their life collide, it is their life that gets the worst of it.

Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Law in the Everyday Life of Women, in LAW
EVERYDAY LIFE 110 (A. Sarat & T.R. Kearns, eds., 1995).
306 See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
307 See supra text accompanying note 303.
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what she has endured, of her place in society, of the function of law.3 °8 As
Reva Siegel has written, "the language of law mediates our understanding
of social relationships" 30 9 and "structures fundamental aspects of our social
experience. 31 0
Criminal law's failure also has implications for battered women as
group members.3 1 What if domestic violence victims could be constituted
by law in a manner that validated, rather than negated, their experiences?
Imagine that legal structures are reformed to account for the reality of
battering and observe what changes follow. 312 Criminalizing the actual
practice of domestic violence is potentially transformative for the battered
woman making sense of her suffering. Systems-social and legalreconfigure themselves around this newly codified understanding of
battering.3 13
In this manner, "[t]he framing of narrative.., carries
308MacKinnon, supra note 305, at 112.

The deepest rules of women's lives are written between the lines, and elsewhere. Yet the actions
and inactions of law construct and constrict women's lives, its consequences no less powerful for
being offstage. Focusing on the areas the law abdicates, its gaps and silences and absences, one
finds that women's everyday life has real rules, but they are not the formal ones.... The rules of
everyday life, in this sense, are that law which is not one, the law for women where there is no
law.
Id.
309

Reva B. Siegel, In the Eyes of the Law: Reflections on the Authority of Legal

Discourse, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 225, 227 (Peter Brooks

& Paul Gewirtz, eds., 1996).
310 Id. at 226.

311 Equal protection norms are embedded in this discussion. See G. Kristian Miccio,
With All Due Deliberate Care: Using International Law and the Federal Violence Against
Women Act to Locate the Contours of State Responsibilityfor Violence Against Mothers in
the Age of Deshaney, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 641 (1998); Dorothy Q. Thomas &
Michele E. Beasley, Symposium on Reconceptualizing Violence Against Women by Intimate
Partners: Critical Issues: Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REV.
1119, 1130-34 (1995).
312 "[L]aw can be a means of defining and redefining selfhood, of perceiving and
reconceiving experience.... Law reform can express new collective identities and needs and
manifest a sensitivity to those needs." SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 8.
313 The synergy that characterizes transformation on individual and systemic dimensions
has been described as follows: "We live within particular cultures that reflect both legal
structures and legal interpretation. Women's lives, culture, and law are in a state of
continuing interaction." Id. at 45. Exploring this same dynamic, Martha Mahoney suggests
that the
interrelationship between women's lives, culture and law .. .is not linear (moving from
women's lives to law, or from law to life) but interactive: cultural assumptions about domestic
violence affect substantive law and methods of litigation in ways that in turn affect society's
perceptions of women; both law and societal perceptions affect women's understanding of our
own lives, relationships and options; our lives are part of the culture that affects legal
interpretation and within which further legal moves are made.
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profoundly political implications. Put differently, the terms of narrative are
prizes in a pitched conflict among groups attempting to describe their social
reality, constitute their social identity, and vindicate their social
existence. 31 4
This notion of vindicating social existence suggests that to grasp the
full extent of criminal law's failings we must broaden our focus beyond the
victim. How does the criminal justice system response to battering give
meaning to larger communal understandings of violence in intimate
relationships?
C. SOCIETY

31 5

What the law defines as domestic violence (and what the law denies is
domestic violence) is generative of extra-legal meaning. 31 6 Simply put, the
practice of battering is understood socially in relation to how it is and is not
criminalized. Legislative constructions of domestic violence seep into the
pores of society in a manner "more pervasive and less perceptible"'31 7 than
is readily apparent. This is of particular concern given the expansive
practice of battering that goes untouched by criminal law.3 18
Mahoney, supra note 12, at 2.
314 JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS

81 (2000). See also Toni Morrison, Nobel Lecture-Nobel
Prize in Literature (Dec. 7, 1993), available at http://www.nobel.se/literature/laureates/
I993/morrison-lecture.html (stating that "narrative is radical, creating us at the very moment
it is being created").
315 For the sake of discussion, I assume the existence of a mutating, bi-directionally
permeable border between law and society. See Siegel, supra note 45, at 2181
("momentarily reify[ing] the distinction between 'law' and 'society"' for purposes of
argument).
316 "Law is made, and operates, in many sites and in many different ways; it does not
exist outside culture but is reflected in popular consciousness, where it takes on a wide range
of cultural forms and produces cultural meanings." SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 8.
317 Siegel, supra note 309, at 226.
OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA

318

For a powerful account of the social significance of legally defining women's

injuries, see Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment:Its First Decade in Court (1986),

in 3 GENDER

AND AMERICAN LAW: THE IMPACT OF THE LAW ON THE LIVES OF WOMEN-THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT 53 (Karen J. Maschke ed., 1997). MacKinnon writes:

The existence of a law against sexual harassment has affected both the context of meaning within
which social life is lived and the concrete delivery of rights through the legal system ....
If
there is no right place to go to say, this hurt me, then a woman is simply the one who can be
treated this way, and no harm, as they say, is done. In point of fact, I would prefer not to have to
spend all this energy getting the law to recognize wrongs to women as wrong. But it seems to be
necessary to legitimize our injuries as injuries in order to delegitimize our victimization by them,
without which it is difficult to move in more positive ways. The legal claim for sexual
harassment made the events of sexual harassment illegitimate socially as well as legally for the
first time. Let me know if you figure out a better way to do that.
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Failure to outlaw the pattern of violence and power that is experienced
by battered women distorts communal understandings of the abuse that is
inflicted in intimate relationships. We do not see battering for what it truly
is. We do not see ourselves as victims or perpetrators of it. We cannot
grapple honestly with its root causes or our own societal complicity in its
perpetuation. Circumscribed by a collective narrowness of understanding,
any social condemnation of domestic violence is, at best, misdirected to a
practice that exists only in the landscape of law. Worse, what the law
quietly calls legal becomes, or remains, socially legitimate.
Whether or not one has directly experienced battering, living in a
society that does not truly condemn it has consequences. For, after all,
"[a]wareness of what the law says is just or unjust, justified or unjustified,
influences all interactions between
people, ultimately shaping their
31 9
identities as well as their goals."
VI. CRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. BATTERING STATUTE

Domestic violence should be criminalized to capture its nature and its
harm. Bringing law into alignment with social reality requires a statutory
definition of battering that encompasses a course of conduct characterized
by power and control. 20 Unless we are willing to concede that battering
lies beyond the reach of the law, domestic violence must be
reconceptualized.
The application of existing legal structures to domestic violence
represents tremendous progress in the development of criminal law. And
yet, for the reasons we have been discussing, new structures are needed to
account for truths antithetical to existing criminal law paradigms. A course
of conduct crime of battering represents the next stage in the evolution of
law's growing responsiveness to harms suffered by women.
A battering statute might read as follows:
A person is guilty of battering when:
He or she intentionally engages in a course of conduct directed at a family or
household member; and

Id. at 103-04.
319 Catherine Albiston et al., Feminism in Relation, 17 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J.
1, 3 (2002).
320 See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 60 ("To bring women's experience into law ...
we
need litigation strategies aimed at exposing the power and control at the heart of battering.").
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He or she knows or reasonably should know that such conduct is likely to result in
substantial power or control over the family or household member; and
At least two acts comprising the course of conduct constitute a crime in this
jurisdiction.
Definitions
"Family or household member," means spouses, former spouses, adults related by
consanguinity or affinity, an adult with whom the actor is or has been in a continuing
relationship of a sexual or otherwise intimate nature, and adults who have a child in
common regardless of whether they have been married or have resided together at any
time.
"Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct comprised of a series of acts over a
period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.
"Crime" means a misdemeanor or a felony.

Note how criminalizing domestic violence as a course of conduct refocuses
the lens through which evidence is filtered. 32' Context is now relevant, as is
relationship. Physical manifestations of power are no longer understood as
the sole incidents of battering. What were seemingly disconnected events
become woven together by the thread of control. Battering is described
accurately by the legislative language which purports to criminalize it.
This proposed statutory framework finds precedent in the substantive
criminal law, which has at times incorporated the proposition that the
legality of acts must at times be assessed in the context of a pattern 324
of
323 defining harassment,
For instance, state statutes
conduct.3 22
321

This statutory definition would constitute the lowest degree of battering.

A

reasonable penal classification scheme would use this statutory language as a basis for
enhancing the degree of the crime in relation to the presence of certain aggravating factors
enumerated by statute. Such aggravating factors might include the use of a weapon,
infliction of physical injury or serious physical injury, the commission of a predicate act that
is defined as felonious, and a prior conviction for battering.
322 Cf Pub. L. No. 54 of August 15, 1989, 8 P.R. LAWs ANN. §§ 601-64 (1996). The
Puerto Rico Domestic Abuse Prevention and Intervention Act, commonly known as Act 54,
recognizes "intimate violence as a manifold experience which is not limited to physical acts,
but also manifests itself through verbal, psychological, sexual and economic actions."
Esther Vicente, Beyond Law Reform: The Experience in Puerto Rico with Implementation of
the Domestic Violence Act, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 553, 576 (1999); see also Jenny Rivera,
Puerto Rico's Domestic Violence Prevention and Intervention Law and the United States
Violence Against Women Act of 1994: The Limitationsof Legislative Responses, 5 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 78, 83-105 (1995). Act 54 broadly criminalizes domestic violence to include
within its ambit psychological abuse, which it defines as a "constant pattern of conduct"
causing grave emotional harm. See Vicente, supra, at 585-89 for a discussion of
psychological abuse provisions of Act 54. Although Act 54 conceives of battering as a
course of conduct, its particular approach to criminalizing domestic violence does differ in
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3232

menacing, ' and course of sexual conduct against a child,32 6 in addition to
the anti-stalking legislation already discussed, 327 all depart from the
transaction-based norm 328 and criminalize a course of conduct. Federal
criminal law has similarly codified the model of crime premised on an
ongoing pattern of conduct. 329 From a doctrinal perspective there is nothing

significant respects from the legislative model I am advocating. See infra notes 355-59 and
accompanying text (discussing problem of line drawing).
323 1 use New York law here to demonstrate the general proposition that course of
conduct statutes exist in our legisprudence.
324 A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, "with intent to harass,
annoy or alarm another person ... he or she engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly
commits acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no
legitimate purpose." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26(3) (West 2004).
325 A person is guilty of menacing in the second degree when "he or she repeatedly
follows a person or engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts over a period
of time intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in reasonable fear or
physical injury, serious physical injury or death." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.14(2) (West
2004).
326 A person is guilty of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree
when, "over a period of time not less than three months duration, he or she engages in two or
more acts of sexual conduct with a child less than eleven years old." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.80(l)(a) (West 2004).
327 See supra Part IV.C.
328 See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
329 For instance, in the federal system, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) makes it illegal to "conduct or participate ... in the conduct of
[an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
(2002). As Gerald Lynch explains,
[tihe very words of the statute reveal an intent to prohibit not any particular, time-bound action,
but a course of conduct extending over a potentially lengthy period of time. Although the
predicate acts of racketeering are conventional crimes, defined in terms of specific conduct, the
actual RICO violation is not identifiable by the physical contours of a particular action or effect.
Rather, the defining characteristic of the "pattern of racketeering" is the relationship of certain
conduct to other conduct and to the "enterprise," which itself is an abstract construct of certain
interpersonal relationships.
Lynch, supra note 63, at 938. Lynch comprehensively discusses ways in which the
enterprise corruption statute challenges the conventional transaction-based model of crime.
Id. at 937-46. After exploring the various critiques of criminal RICO prosecutions, he
concludes that "to the extent that RICO is not fully consistent with our traditional notions of
what constitutes a crime, such inconsistency does not automatically discredit the statute, but
rather constitutes reasons to reexamine those notions." Gerald E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime
of Being a Criminal, Parts I & H1, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 661, 664 (1987). Given that the
analogy between battering and enterprise corruption is of limited heuristic value, further
analysis of the complexities and criticisms of RICO is beyond the scope of this discussion.
See also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002) (stating that mail fraud requires continuing course of
conduct defined as "scheme to defraud").
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revolutionary about criminalizing domestic violence in the manner I am
advocating.
What is, of course, unique to this legislation is that the defendant must
know or reasonably should know that his conduct is likely to result in
substantial power and control over the victim. Defining this element is a
particularly thorny aspect of the legislative piece. "Recognizing the
batterer's attempt at domination as the key to battering relationships allows
a focus on his motivations rather than the psychology of the victim. ' 330 Yet
prosecutors would understandably balk at a requirement that intentional
mens rea be proven with respect to the exercise of power and control. The
difficulty of convincing jurors beyond a reasonable doubt that a batterer
consciously intended to dominate his victim may be practically
insurmountable.33 1
Another option would be to define the element in relation to the
victim: the statute could require proof that the victim was in fact dominated
and controlled as a result of the defendant's scheme.
But this is
problematic from an evidentiary perspective, as it suggests (or at least does
not preclude) that the victim must be completely subordinated for the
defendant to be convicted. It is also troubling phenomenologically, since a
focus on the victim's domination will tend to obscure evidence of
agency.332
In the statute I am proposing, prosecutors would be required to prove
that the defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct likely to result in
substantialpower or control over the victim. Defining the element in this
manner emphasizes the natural consequences of the abuser's pattern of

330 Mahoney, supra note 12, at 57.
3 Most jurisdictions define this state of mind as follows: a person acts "intentionally"

with respect to a result or to conduct when his conscious objective is to cause such result or
to engage in such conduct. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1) (West 2004); CONN. CRIM.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.47. In the battering context, proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant engaged in a course of conduct consciously aimed at controlling his victim
would be extremely difficult. Here the distinction between motive-which may be
subconscious-and intent-which legally may not be subconscious-is significant. The
proposed statutory definition avoids the need for the prosecutor to prove intentional mens
rea with respect to the power and control element.
332 One can imagine the litigation strategies on the part of both prosecution and defense
that would develop under a statutory framework that made proof of actual subordination an
element of the crime. Even in the absence of this element, it is "difficult ...to present a
complex account of women as both oppressed and struggling." Mahoney, supra note 3, at
61. By defining accurately the practice of domestic violence, the battering statute enables
this more complex account to be told. See id. at 73 ("[T]reat[ing] battering as a pattern of
power and control [is] essential to show both agency and oppression in the lives of women,
making women's experiences and life choices comprehensible.").
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activity 333 while avoiding a singular inquiry into the victim's powerlessness.
The practice of battering is truly rendered by the prosecution's satisfaction
of its burden of proof.
Outside law,334 the meaning of domestic violence is transformed by a
redefined crime of battering. What once was socially invisible can be
called by its name, and conduct that was condoned may now be
condemned. This next move, then, is critical.
B. POTENTIAL CRITIQUES
Fundamental criminal law paradigms are in tension with the
remediation of battering. 3 " To the extent that improving the criminal
justice response to domestic violence requires the reshaping of traditional
structures, these reforms will inevitably be viewed as threatening
convention. 336 With this in mind, we might predict that specific features of
the proposed statutory approach will be challenged: the move away from an
incident-centered
crime
model; 337
avoidance
of
particularity
338
requirements;
alleged circumvention of statutes of limitations; 33 9 the
potential for duplicitious verdicts, 340 double jeopardy and collateral
333 Testimony by the victim about the actual impact of the defendant's conduct would of

course be relevant to this element.
334 See supra note 315.
335 See supra Part II.C.
336 Cf Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 2151. Stephen Schulhofer writes:
The feminist challenge is to adapt male-oriented criminal laws and practices to the concerns of a
group of victims and offenders who are normally left out of the picture. This turns out to be
difficult, and not just because of a lack of empathy for the needs of women. Factoring female
victims and offenders into the criminal law equation is hard because of many conflicting
concerns and commitments that most Americans share.
Id.
337 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.

338 See supra note 71.
339 The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a continuing crime is complete.
See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 71, § 18.5. "Certain crimes are properly
characterized as continuing offenses, and as to them the time begins to run only when the
course of conduct or defendant's complicity therein terminates." Id.
340 "[D]ue process has long been held to impose a requisite degree of specificity, so that
no person is punished 'save upon proof of some illegal conduct."' Id. at 1157 (quoting
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 633 (1991)). Jurors need not agree unanimously that
particular facts have been proven; they must simply be unanimous in deciding that each
element of the crime has been proven. With respect to the proposed battering statute, if each
juror is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that both the charged predicate acts and the
alleged course of conduct have been proven, conviction is proper-regardless of whether the
jury is unanimously agreed on which particular acts comprising the course of conduct have
been proven. Id. at 1156-58. The jury must be properly instructed on the elements of a
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estoppel;3 4' and what might be characterized as insufficient notice or undue
vagueness.342
A response to these content-neutral objections may be simply stated: a
carefully drafted statute protects against violations of the rights of criminal
defendants. To the extent that the legislation departs from established
criminal law norms, it does so with ample precedent and exceedingly
powerful justification. The remainder of this Part will focus on challenges
raised by the very existence of a battering statute, as opposed to those
presented by its operational constructs.
1. Formal Equality
If the criminal law is to remedy a harm suffered uniquely by women,
gender difference inevitably becomes salient.343
Its discomfiting
appearance tends to provoke default to the trope of formal equality, which
insists that domestic violence be approached no differently from any other
crime. Those who invoke the ideal of formal equality may believe that
"unequal treatment" is unfair as a purely normative matter, or that "unequal
treatment" will have practical consequences that are undesirable.344
course of conduct charge in order to ensure against a multi-theory verdict. See Richardson v.
United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(upholding jury instructions in RICO prosecution).
341 See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
guarantee against double jeopardy encompasses principle of collateral estoppel). See
generally LAFAVE ET. AL, supra note 71, at 839-50.
342 A statute criminalizing battering must be drawn with sufficient
precision to avoid
constitutional challenge. For a discussion of the vagueness issues raised by anti-stalking
legislation, see Salame, supra note 223, at 94-95. Stalking statutes pass the Supreme Court's
test for vagueness even though they "do not describe every possible 'course of conduct' or
act which constitutes stalking." Id. at 95 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972)); see Carol E. Jordan et al., Stalking: Cultural,Clinical and Legal Considerations,38
BRANDEIS L.J. 513, 563-76 (2000) ("Since their passage in the early 1990s, courts have
upheld the great majority of stalking statutes against constitutional challenges. Most
commonly, defendants have asserted that the stalking statutes fail as being void for
vagueness, or that they are overly broad, in violation of the First Amendment."). For
discussion of similar constitutional issues in the RICO context, see David W. Gartenstein &
Joseph F. Warganz, Note, RICO's Pattern Requirement: Void for Vagueness?, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 489 (1990).
343 Gender is salient despite the facial neutrality of a statute criminalizing battering. This
is because the social practice of battering (onto which law is mapped) is deeply gendered.
See supra note 5 (in overwhelming majority of cases women are the victims and men the
perpetrators of domestic violence).
344 See Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARv. L.
REV. 1505, 1527 (1993):
[Dlomestic violence should not be treated as a special crime. Any special treatment or policy
"adjustments" other than the increased allocation of resources and vigorous prosecution will
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But we have seen that law's conception of domestic violence as like
other violence is fundamentally flawed. 345 The rhetorical and philosophical
appeal of formal equality should not obscure this reality 346 and certainly
cannot alter it.
2. Pragmatic

Related to the practical workings of the legislation are considerations
of how the elements of a battering statute might be satisfied at trial. 347 The
pragmatist contemplates proof issues likely to arise when the law is applied
to realities of abusive relationships.
While victim-blaming is always a potential problem in domestic
violence trials, the introduction of evidence of a relationship replete with
on-going, patterned abuse may have a paradoxical effect. Evidence of
context or relationship, while essential to the crime and its proof, may
nevertheless create unwarranted barriers to conviction. The introduction of
a fuller narrative to describe the battering course of conduct may defy jury
have stigmatizing effects for the victims, hamper energetic enforcement efforts, and serve to
perpetuate myths and societal tolerance for woman battering. Formally equal treatment. . . will
facilitate the recognition of woman battering as an equally undesirable crime as other assaults
and batteries .... Woman battering should be treated like any other violent crime.

Id.

345 See supra Part 1I. Writing broadly about criminal law's treatment of gender
difference, Stephen Schulhofer has made these general observations:
[Allthough we want women to be treated the same as men, sometimes equality cannot be
achieved by treating two groups of people the same way. We need to take differences into
account. Yet drawing categorical distinctions between men and women undermines our ideals.
This is the familiar debate concerning sameness versus difference ... [which] plays out with
some unexpected twists in criminal justice.

Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 2151-52; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 134 (discussing
feminist challenges to models of formal equality "as based on a male standard and not
accommodating women's experiences and perspectives").
346 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: The Meaning of Gender Equality in Criminal
Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,3 (1994):
Feminists examining criminal law should be concerned with uncovering the ways that the
criminal law contributes to women's deprivation by continuing to reflect and protect patriarchal
interests .... It is essential, however, to acknowledge the power differences between men and
women and then work to eliminate them. As Fran Olsen puts it, it is pointless "to pretend that
men and women are similarly situated."
Id. (quoting Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 387, 412 (1984)).
347 All prosecutorial decision making is ultimately framed by the question of what
charges can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. "A prosecutor should not institute, cause
to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of
sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993).
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comprehension, 4 creating a need for expert testimony to explain the
dynamics of domestic violence. 49
Another way of articulating this concern is to observe that, in a
prosecution under the proposed battering statute, jurors may fail to engage
with the full implications of the batterer's exercise of power and control. If
so, their deliberations will tend to stall around the leaving question. This
stall may manifest itself as a challenge to the victim's credibility or morph
into an unarticulated sense that by "choosing to stay," she forfeited her right
to law's protection.35 °
We should watch for the sub rosa operation of the depressingly
perennial inquiry: "why she didn't leave."35' As Martha Mahoney has
written:
The question "why didn't you leave" implies that exit is always the appropriate
response to violence, and tends to hide all the things women actually do to cope with
violence and to resist the batterers' quest for control. This "shopworn question"
implicitly asserts both that leaving is possible and that it will bring safety. In truth,
either staying or leaving are often dangerous acts for women. When a woman tries to
stop battering without leaving, or stays because she fears
352 retaliation, she may find that
failure to exit is used against her socially and legally."

This is ironic yet understandable given that social understandings of the practice of
battering are at best incomplete. As Martha Mahoney writes:
348

Domestic violence is beyond the layman's ken (even though we know it is fairly common)
because some jurors will interpret their own experience through cultural perceptions that distort
understanding and make it difficult for all of us to talk about the subject, and because cultural
stereotypes will shape the vision of battered women held by jurors who have no personal
experience of such violence as well.

Mahoney, supra note 12, at 42.
349See supra Part IV.B.
350Jurors may blame the victim for domestic violence even when there is no evidence

that she "stayed" in a relationship characterized by on-going abuse. Where evidence of ongoing abuse is admitted, however, there may be a somewhat greater likelihood that, in the
absence of juror understanding, the evidence will have the unintended consequence of
triggering a blaming response.
351 Mahoney, supra note 12, at 61:
The "shopworn question" persists in the cases, legal scholarship, and social science literature. It
reveals several assumptions about separation: that the right solution is separation, that it is the
woman's responsibility to achieve separation, and that she could have separated. The question
"why didn't she leave" is actually an objectifying statement that asserts that the woman did not
leave. Asking this question often makes actual separations disappear.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
352 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 76.
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It is possible that the force of a complete account of the battering will
propel the jurors past this inquiry.35 But until the meaning of "staying" in a
violent relationship has been socially redefined, expert testimony on the
in some cases criticalnature of battering will serve an important-and
354
function in domestic violence trials.
In some cases prosecutors may rely on experts to help prove the crime
of battering; this does not, of course, render the statute objectionable.
Decisions about whether to charge the course-of-conduct or to rely on
traditional criminal laws to prosecute a batterer-as well as what evidence
to seek to introduce-will ultimately lie with the prosecutor. Over time, the
need for juror education about the dynamics of domestic violence should
diminish as social understandings of battering grow. A battering statute is
an integral part of this sociolegal transformation.
3. Anti-Criminalization
Criminalizing battering starkly presents the problem of line drawing.355
The spectre of law creeping into new places (relationships) will--expressly
One
or obliquely-animate opposition to the proposed legislation.
argument is this: once we move away from a crime model that is incidentbased and focused on physical injury, we blur distinctions between batterers
(i.e., criminals) and men who are simply controlling (i.e., not criminals).
This legal entanglement in the messy imbroglio of intimacy is dangerous
and ultimately doomed.356
This critique is, in effect, a challenge to placement of the line
demarcating illegal conduct. 357 Here the contention is that a course of
353 By this I mean that some victims may be able to articulate their reasons for "staying"
in a manner that satisfies the jurors.
354 See supra Part IV.B.
355 As Deborah Denno has remarked, "[t]here are many line-drawing dilemmas
throughout the criminal law." Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and
Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 274 (2002). The line-drawing critique is distinct
from (though related to) so-called "slippery slope" arguments, since it concerns itself with
the placement of the border between lawful and unlawful conduct, as opposed to the
potential for border movement.
35" A related objection concedes the wrongfulness of battering conduct in the abstract and
focuses on the difficulty of identifying it in any given relationship. In this regard, consider
the reasoning of People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981), upholding the marital rape
exemption based in part on the following consideration: "[T]he marital exception averts
difficult emotional issues and problems of proof inherent in this sensitive area. Otherwise,
juries would be expected to fathom the intimate sexual feelings, frustrations, habits, and
understandings unique to particular marital relationships." Id. at 1027 (internal citations
omitted).
357 See supra note 355.
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conduct statute encompasses behavior that-although not admirableshould not be condemned by law. Note that this argument is historically
iterated.358 It is also intricately connected to ideals of family and gender
relations in ways that may be counterintuitive:
Acknowledging battering as part of a continuum forces us . . . to confront our
fantasies of the family as a haven. If battering is perceived not simply as physical
abuse but as an issue of power and control, it threatens our traditional notions of the
family even more profoundly. It is far easier to distance ourselves when the issue is
physical 35
abuse
rather than personal domination, which may feel uncomfortably close
9
to home.

Recognizing that the line-drawing critique is evocative of privacybased rationales for legal non-intervention does not, of course, definitively
resolve the question of precisely how criminal law should define battering.
We might, for instance, wonder about relationships in which power is
wielded and control exercised without resort
to physical violence. Should
360
criminalized?
be
behavior
of
these patterns
Though unremediated suffering by women has a history that should
make us leery of partial justice,361 concerns about too radically expanding
criminal law boundaries should not be dismissed.362 We would ideally
close the gap between law's conception of domestic violence and the social
practice of battering in a manner that does not depart dramatically from
established norms.363

358 See generally Siegel, supra note 45.
359 SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 66. A similar insight has been framed more broadly by

Victoria Nourse, who has written that "feminism contests powerful social norms about
intimate relationships, which makes reform intensely controversial in very personal ways.
People resist feminism because it seems to place them in positions in which they may have
to question their most intimate relationships, their identity, and their daily lives." Victoria
Nourse, The "'Normal"Successes and Failuresof Feminism and the Criminal Law, 75 CHI.KENT L. REv. 951,977 (2000).
360 See supra note 322 (describing Puerto Rico's domestic violence statute criminalizing
psychological abuse).
361 See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2321-22 (1989) ("The kinds of injuries and harms historically
left to private individuals to absorb and resist through private means is no accident. The
places where the law does not go to redress harm have tended to be the places where women,
children, people of color, and poor people live."); Schulhofer, supra note 44 (stating that
"criminal law is, from top to bottom, preoccupied with male concerns and male
perspectives"); supra Part lI.B (discussing criminalization of domestic violence in historical
context).
362 See supra Part VI.B.3 (discussing anti-criminalization critique).
363 Implicit in this discussion is the notion that illegality and immorality are conceptually
distinct categories. See LAFAvE, supra note 71, at I I ("[l]mmorality and criminality, though
related, are not synonymous.").
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The proposed legislation is framed around conduct already defined as
illegal, 364 but brings within its ambit the pattern of power and control that is
the essence of the crime of battering. A course of conduct battering statute
built around predicate acts already criminalized thus represents law's
natural evolution.
A further challenge to the battering statute comes from those wary of
reliance on a flawed criminal justice system.365 Feminists and critical race
scholars have observed in the context of domestic violence prosecution (and
more generally) that the system is racist, 3 66 classist, 367 and sexist. 368 Despite

the emergence of what has been described as a "discourse emphasizing
crime control," there is still "considerable debate within the battered
women's movement and among legal advocates, particularly among
communities of color, who do not see the state as benevolent., 369 A policy
of aggressive criminal justice intervention in violent relationships uniquely
impacts women "sandwiched by their heightened vulnerability to battering,

364 A battering statute might be further restricted in scope by limiting the qualifying
predicate acts to crimes of violence specifically referenced by the statute.
365 See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal

Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 690-700 (1995); Donna Coker, Crime Control and
Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
801 (2001).
366

See DERRICK BELL,

RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW

329-47 (3d. ed. 1992); Butler,

supra note 365, at 690-700 (racial critiques of criminal justice system); Siegel, supra note
45, at 2134-41 (historical account of race and class bias in domestic violence prosecution).
Proponents of criminalization must confront the fact that young black males born in the
United States in the early 1990s faced an estimated lifetime risk of incarceration of 28.5%,
compared to an estimated 4.4% risk among white males of a similar age. BUREAU OF JUST.
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2000 (March 2001).
On how this intersection of race and the criminal justice system impacts the lives of
domestic violence victims of color, see Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 1253-58.
367 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 45, at 2134.
368 See generally Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of
Criminalization,49 DEPAUL L. REV. 817 (2000); Coker, supra note 365. "[C]rime control
policies result in greater state control of women, particularly poor women." Coker, supra
note 365, at 805; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 182-84 (discussing changing feminist
conceptions of role of state in combating domestic violence); Hanna, supra note 5
(dissecting tension between victim autonomy and aggressive prosecution of battering).
369 SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 184. Angela Davis has urged:
We need an analysis that furthers neither the conservative project of sequestering millions of
men of color in accordance with the contemporary dictates of globalized capital and its prison
industrial complex, nor the equally conservative project of abandoning poor women of color to a
continuum of violence that extends from the sweatshops through the prisons, to shelters, and into
bedrooms at home.
Coker, supra note 365, at 807-08 (quoting Angela Davis, Keynote Address to Color of
Violence Conference).
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on the one hand, and
their heightened vulnerability to intrusive state
37 0
control, on the other.,
Without denying the power of these critiques, a few related
observations may be made. Domestic violence will not be eradicated by
criminal law alone. Criminalizing battering as a course of conduct is a
critical component of what must necessarily be a multi-faceted enterprise.3 7'
But the impossibility of the system providing a total fix does not warrant its
rejection.372
Before abandoning the criminal law we should think carefully about
life in its void. Even those skeptical of criminalization would, I suspect,
acknowledge this: unless we are prepared to consign battered women to a
place beyond the reach of criminal justice, a law that truly condemns
domestic violence is better than one that does not.
VII. CONCLUSION
Given that domestic violence was once legally condoned, the
development of a criminal justice system response to battering may be
viewed as a story of progress. Without minimizing that progress, this
Article has demonstrated that criminal law's evolution in this area is not
complete. The laws that exist to remedy paradigmatic stranger violence, no
matter how rigorously they are enforced, cannot remedy domestic violence.
Law's failure to redress the ongoing, patterned nature of battering and
non-physical manifestations of the abuser's effort to dominate his victim
370 Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and

Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2000). Coker argues that "poor
women and particularly poor women of color should be the focus for evaluating antidomestic violence law and policies." Coker, supra note 365, at 811; see also id. at 858-59:
Poor women are subject to adual vulnerability: the private coercion and violence of abusive men
and the public coercion and violence of the state. When battered women's advocates negotiate
with the state, the challenge is to develop strategies that ensure a positive state response, while
limiting the risk that these interventions will result in increased state control of women.
Id.

371 See Coker, Crime Control,supra note 365, at 859 ("We must begin to articulate
that
economic justice for women and children is part of domestic violence prevention."). We
would predict a symbiotic relationship between criminal law reform and other efforts, legal
and non-legal, to end the practice of battering. Cf Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice
System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60
WASH. L. REV. 267, 301 (1985) ("[D]o nothing arguments ignore the symbolic value of the
law-that the law can lead as well as follow. By taking unequivocal action against battering,
the legal system can eventually make inroads against the social forces that condone abuse.").
372 Cf Waits, supra note 371, at 298-302 (discussing need for legal intervention and
rejecting argument that law is "ill-equipped to deal with complex social and psychological
problems like battering and should thus avoid them").
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means that domestic violence has been criminalized in a manner that
negates the essence of battering. As a consequence, battering as it practiced
and experienced in the world lies outside the criminal law. Denial that
battering is fundamentally different from violence against non-intimates is
fatal to the effective functioning of the criminal justice system in this realm.
Under current statutory definitions of domestic violence, deep and
pervasive suffering by battered women is not redressed and the infliction of
such suffering is not condemned. The failure of criminal law to recognize
and remedy harms to women is not new, nor is it inevitable. Configuring
legal structures to recognize and criminalize the violent exercise of power
and control in intimate relationships represents the next phase of law's
evolving response to the practice of battering.
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